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COPYRIGHT, CONGRESS, AND
CONSTITUTIONALITY: HOW THE DIGITAL
MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT GOES TOO FAR
Thomas A. Mitchell*
While the need for some sort of meaningful protection scheme
aimed at protecting works that can be digitized can hardly be ques-
tioned, no matter how laudable, legislation that violates the United
States Constitution must be declared invalid.'
INTRODuCTION
Over the last decade, advances in technology have been stagger-
ing. The most notable changes have been the advancements in digital
technology and the rise of the Internet. 2 These two developments
have profoundly impacted copyright law, by allowing copyrighted
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2005; B.B.A. in
Management, Texas A&M University, 2002. This Note is dedicated to my parents,
Anne andJames, and my sister Mari, for all of their support, love, and encouragement
throughout the years, andJessie Tannenbaum andJulie Brown: I love you both, and I
could not ask for better friends. To Matt Arend and Elizabeth Gray, I would be remiss
if I left you out, you are two of the best friends I have ever had. This Note would not
have been possible without any of you, and I sincerely appreciate everything you have
done for me.
1 Eugene R. Quinn,Jr., An Unconstitutional Patent in Disguise: Did Congress Overstep
Its Constitutional Authority in Adopting the Circumvention Prevention Provisions of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act?, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 33, 36 (2002); see also Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("[A]n act of the legislature, repugnant to the
constitution, is void.").
2 See generally Kenneth L. Karst, Law, Cultural Conflict, and the Socialization of Chil-
dren, 91 CAL. L. REV. 967, 1010 (2003) (recognizing that "the technology of the In-
temet is continuing to change rapidly"); Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope: Interpreting
"Access" and "Authorization" in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1596, 1599
(2003) (acknowledging the rapidity of change on the Internet); Peter S. Menell, Envi-
sioning Copyright Law's Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 63, 66 (2002) (stating that
"rapid advances in digital technology have increasingly brought digital content to
consumers"); Steven I. Platt, Today's Business!Technology Case Management Program, MD.
B.J. Nov./Dec. 2003, at 35, 38 (noting that the Internet causes rapid change); J.H.
Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientyic
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materials to be disseminated to anyone with access to the Internet,
instantaneously and without loss of quality in the work.3 The speed at
which technology changes far surpasses the ability of the slow-chang-
ing legal system to keep up. 4 This creates a problem for copyright
holders, 5 who face decreasing protection of their works by the legal
system. This problem is somewhat alleviated by technological changes
that help protect copyrighted work, such as encryption. However, "for
every technology that can be created to protect information, there is a
Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
315, 317 (2003) (discussing effects of the "rapid advances in digital technologies").
3 See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 452 (2d Cir. 2001)
(discussing the ability of the Internet to disseminate information instantaneously and
globally, while retaining the quality of the original); Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v.
Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussing
the increasing ability of the Internet to be used for copyright violations, due to lack of
degradation in quality of copies and improvements in speed of dissemination over the
Internet); In reVerizon Internet Servs., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24, 38 (D.D.C. 2003) (noting
Congress's concern over copyright protection "in light of rapid technological innova-
tions on the Internet that make copyright theft easy, virtually instantaneous, and un-
detectable"); PATRICIA L. BELLIA ET AL., CYBERLAW: PROBLEMS OF PoIucv AND
JURISPRUDENCE IN THE INFORMATION AGE 495 (2003) ("One who wishes to copy and
circulate copyrighted material in digital form can do so quickly, inexpensively, and
without any degradation in quality.").
4 See Brian M. Werst, A Survey of the First Amendment "Indecency" Legal Doctrine and
Its Inapplicability to Internet Regulation: A Guide for Protecting Children from Internet Decency
After Reno v. ACLU, 33 GONZ. L. REv. 207, 224 (1997) ("Furthermore, there is an
increasing misfit between law and technology; technology can move with stunning
speed while the law moves slowly and is hard-pressed to catch up with technological
changes."); see also Kris Gautier, Electronic Commerce: Confronting the Legal Challenge of
Building E-Dentities in Cyberspace, 20 Miss. C. L. REV. 117, 140 (1999) ("Another prob-
lem with relying on patent law to resolve disputes in connection with e-commerce is
the speed at which technology practices change."); Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Pri-
vacy Law: A Century Since Warren and Brandeis, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 703, 720 (1990)
("Because this technology has grown with incredible speed, privacy law has had diffi-
culty keeping pace with these changes, and many commentators have complained
that the law no longer provides adequate protection against the intrusions of the
Computer Age."); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Shaping Competition on the Internet: Who Owns
Product and Pricing Information?, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1965, 1993 (2000) (noting congres-
sional inability to keep pace with the speed of technological change); Robert Pitofsky,
Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues at the Heart of the New Economy, 16
BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 535, 557 (2001) ("On the other hand, law enforcement can rarely
equal the speed of economic change in high-technology sectors.").
5 This problem is demonstrated by the series of lawsuits commenced by the mu-
sic industry in an effort to prevent digital distribution of music. See, e.g., In reAimster
Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284
F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 243 F.
Supp. 2d 1073 (C.D. Cal. 2003); In reVerizon Internet Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24
(D.D.C. 2003).
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technology waiting to be created, and which will be created, to
counteract the protection provided. '" 6
Congress responded to this problem in 1998, by passing the Digi-
tal Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA or "the Act"). 7 The Act was
purportedly designed to increase the protection afforded to copyright
holders and their works.8 The Act, however, goes too far in its protec-
tions. By extending the author's or creator's control beyond control
of his own work, it allows him to prevent others from creating works of
their own. This problem results from the fact that "the protection
afforded is not for the invention or technology created or used by the
copyright owner, but rather the right to exclude others from creating
the inverse invention or technology."9 Section 1201 prohibits circum-
vention of, and trafficking in devices designed to circumvent, techno-
logical measures that control access to a protected work.10 This aspect
of the DMCA is constitutionally problematic because Congress's pow-
ers are limited to those enumerated in the Constitution1 ' as supple-
mented by the Necessary and Proper Clause.12 Congress's authority13
for the DMCA must come from either the Copyright Clause, 14 the
Commerce Clause,' 5 or the treaty power.' 6 However, as the Act is not
restricted to the actual protection of copyrighted material, Congress
overstepped the bounds of these clauses when it enacted such sweep-
ing legislation. This problem is demonstrated in the Act's effect of
6 Quinn, supra note 1, at 51-52; see also BELLIA ET AL., supra note 3, at 270 (not-
ing that it is unclear whether technological changes expand or contract control over
content).
7 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000); H.R. REP. No. 105-551 (1998).
8 H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 25.
9 Quinn, supra note 1, at 65.
10 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201.
11 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) ("The Constitution creates
a Federal Government of enumerated powers."); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) ("This government is acknowledged by all, to be one of enu-
merated powers."); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) ("The
powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be
mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is written."); THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 328
(James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961) ("The powers delegated by
the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined.").
12 See U.S CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
13 See Vanhorne v. Dorrance, 28 F. Cas. 1012, 1014 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (No.
16,857) ("The constitution fixes limits to the exercise of legislative authority, and
prescribes the orbit within which it must move.").
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
15 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
16 See id. art I, § 8, cl. 18; id., art. II, § 2, cl. 2; id., art. VI, § 1, cl. 2; Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-35 (1920).
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discouraging research,' 7 which runs contrary to the purpose of the
Copyright Clause.18
This Note will describe how Congress exceeded its powers by en-
acting § 1201 of the DMCA. 19 Although courts and commentators
have considered this argument previously, the reasoning behind the
unconstitutionality of the DMCA has never been fully analyzed. This
Note, therefore, attempts to fill this gap by providing a thorough ex-
amination of all of the factors that contribute to the unconstitutional-
ity of the DMCA. The first part will provide the background of the
Copyright Clause and will discuss the purpose of its inclusion in the
Constitution. The second part will discuss the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, its purpose (as shown by its legislative history), and its
effects. The next three parts will show that none of the three possible
sources of power under which Congress could have enacted these pro-
visions actually gives it the authority to do so. 20 The sixth part will
analyze the four cases21 in which the constitutional authority of Con-
gress to enact these provisions has been questioned. 22 Part VII will
discuss two bills that have been proposed in the last year, both of
which are efforts to modify the DMCA due to recognition of deficien-
cies in the statute. Finally, in Part VIII, this Note will provide some
examples of the effects of the Act.
17 See, e.g., ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: FIVE
YEARS UNDER THE DMCA (2003), available at http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/
unintendedconsequences.pdf.
18 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
19 For simplicity, the terms DMCA and Digital Millennium Copyright Act will be
used to refer to § 1201 of the DMCA for the remainder of this Note.
20 The possible sources of power are the Copyright Clause, the Commerce
Clause, and the treaty power. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
21 These cases are: Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir.
2001); United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Felten v.
Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. (D.NJ. 2002) (No. CV-01-2669 (GEB)); and 321 Stu-
dios v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2002) (No. C 02-1955
SI), available at http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/20021220-321-studios-complaint.
pdf.
22 The constitutionality of these sections has been called into question in a num-
ber of cases; the majority of these cases, however, are based on alleged restrictions on
First Amendment freedom of speech. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley,
273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that the DMCA does not violate the First
Amendment). This Note focuses instead on whether Congress had the power to en-
act the DMCA in the first place, as opposed to whether the effect of the DMCA is to
violate the First Amendment.
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I. THE DRAFTING OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PURPOSE
OF THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE
Congress's authority to regulate intellectual property emanates
from Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution
(the Copyright Clause). The Copyright Clause states: "The Congress
shall have the power... [t] o promote the Progress of Science and the
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.... ,,23
Several issues arise merely from a facial reading of the text of the
clause. First, "[u]nlike the other enumerated powers, which denomi-
nate a sphere of authority and leave the details to Congress, the Copy-
right Clause includes specific parameters for the content of copyright
law."'24 This shows that the ability of Congress to regulate intellectual
property matters is more restricted than Congress's power in the
other enumerated areas. The parameters by which the clause limits
Congress's power include: (1) rights were to be given to "Authors,"
(2) rights were only to be given for "limited Times," and (3) rights
were designed "to promote the Progress of Science and the useful
Arts." 25 These limits restrict both Congress's ability to act and the
rights it may confer to protect intellectual property. Thus, the facial
purpose of the clause is to protect intellectual property, but only for
the purpose of promoting progress. Further, even for this purpose,
the monopoly granted for protection is limited: it can only be pro-
vided to authors, not publishers, and not permanently. This means
that the purpose, as derived from the text of the clause, is to promote
progress and learning by providing incentives to conduct research,
but only to provide sufficient incentives for research to be conducted.
The purpose of the clause can be extrapolated in more detail
from the records of the Constitution and the communications
amongst the Framers. Statements by George Washington indicate
that the intention of the Founders in drafting the clause was "to en-
gender a marketplace in writings."2 6 This suggests that George Wash-
ington did not believe the clause to give copyright protections because
23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
24 Marci A. Hamilton, The Historical and Philosophical Underpinnings of the Copyright
Clause, in 5 OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FROM BENJAMIN N. CAR-
DOZO SCHOOL OF LAW, YESHIVA UNIVERsITY 8 (1999).
25 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
26 Hamilton, supra note 24, at 10 (citing George Washington, Address to Con-
gress (Jan. 8, 1790), reprinted in COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT IN PROGRESS,
1780-1904, at 115-16 (1976)).
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of any intention to protect authors, but only for the purpose of pro-
moting learning.
The Records of the Federal Convention also show that the Foun-
ders were primarily concerned with promoting progress, not with pro-
tecting authors. Intellectual property protection was first proposed by
Charles Pinckney on May 28, 1787.27 In this proposal, the language
chosen provided that the "National Legislature" would have authority
"to secure to Authors the exclusive right to their Performances and
Discoveries." 28 "No action was taken on the Pinckney proposal, nor
was reference made to the subject of copyright in the August 6, 1787,
draft of the Constitution reported out by the Committee on Detail. '29
This shows that the protection of intellectual property was not one of
the more pressing issues. When intellectual property proposals were
next made, on August 18, there were competing proposals by Madison
and Pinckney on the subject.30 Madison made two proposals: "[tlo
secure to literary authors their copyrights for a limited time" and "l[t] o
encourage by premiums & provisions, the advancement of useful
knowledge and discoveries."3 Pinckney made a competing proposal:
"[t] o secure to Authors exclusive rights for a certain time."3 2 All three
of these proposals demonstrate a more restricted approach to the
grant of copyright protection than Pinckney's original proposal.
Madison restricted his proposed grant of protection by limiting the
length of protection in the first proposal and by merely allowing for
incentives for learning in his second proposal. Pinckney also limited
his proposal by only providing copyright protection for a certain time.
The more limited proposals made at this time, coupled with the rejec-
tion and complete lack of discussion of the original proposal, demon-
strate a hesitance on the part of the Convention to adopt plenary
rights for authors and inventors. Limiting these rights also shows that
the rights were not intended solely to protect the works, but, at least
partially, to provide incentives to create the work in the first place. If
the intention was merely to protect copyright holders and their works,
there would be no reason to limit the rights conferred upon authors.
This conclusion is supported by the final version of the clause adopted
by the Convention on September 5, 1787, " [t]o promote the progress
of Science and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors &
27 See 3 THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 122 (Max Farrand
ed., 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND].
28 3 id.
29 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 22-23 (1994).
30 2 FARRAND, supra note 27, at 325.
31 2 id.
32 2 id.
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inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discover-
ies."'33 This clause, which was unanimously accepted without com-
ment or debate, 34 is a composition of Madison's second and
Pinckney's later proposals. This compromise includes both limita-
tions in the later proposals: it includes the concept of promotion of
research and limits the time for which rights are granted. Again, this
indicates that the Framers intended to promote learning when they
enacted the Copyright Clause.
Despite this, however, the purpose behind the Copyright Clause
has been debated since the time of the Constitution.3 5 Four theories
have been proposed: "that copyright is to protect the author's rights;
that copyright is to promote learning; that copyright is to provide or-
der in the book trade as a government grant; and that copyright is to
prevent harmful monopoly."36 All of these theories find some support
in scholarly literature.37 However, as the analysis above shows, the
proposal with the strongest protections for authors' rights was re-
jected in favor of a learning-based proposal, indicating that the pri-
mary purpose of copyright protections is to promote learning.
Furthermore, the rejection of the language used in state copyright
statutes, which relied on author's rights as the primary purpose of
copyright,38 lends further credence to the idea that the Copyright
Clause was primarily intended to promote learning. Therefore, in the
words of Professor Patterson, "[t]he dominant idea in the minds of
the framers of the Constitution appears to have been the promotion
of learning."39
33 2 id. at 509.
34 2 id. at 510.
35 See, e.g., L'MAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTOICAL PERSPECTIVE 181
(1968).
36 Id.
37 See, e.g., Stephanie L. Brauner, High-Tech Boxing Match: A Discussion of Copyright
Theory Underlying the Heated Battle Between the RIAA and MP3ers, 4 VA.J.L. & TECH. 5, 17
(1999) (noting the theory that copyright orders the book trade); Nicole B. Cdsarez,
Deconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine: The Cost of Personal and Workplace Copying After Amer-
ican Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 6 FoRDtHu INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
641, 650 (1996) (noting that the "Supreme Court has held that the ultimate goal of
copyright law is . . .to advance learning"); Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and
Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REv. 275, 322 (1989) (noting that copyright was to
broadly encompass the notion of author's rights); Beth F. Dumas, Note, The Function-
ality Doctrine in Trade Dress and Copyright Infringement Actions: A Call for Clarification, 12
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 471, 493 (1990) (asserting copyright ensures that "com-
petition is free and fair").
38 See PATrERSON, supra note 35, at 183-88.
39 Id. at 193. More recently, Professor Patterson has stated that "[w]hat is pro-
tected is not so much the right of the copyright holder to exploit the work as the right
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The attitudes of the Framers also support this purpose of the
clause. 40 The debate amongst the Framers about the grant of a mo-
nopoly to authors can best be seen by two letters between James
Madison and Thomas Jefferson. The first letter, datedJuly 31, 1788, is
from Jefferson to Madison. 4 1 In it, Jefferson displayed his doubt as to
the wisdom of granting even limited monopolies. "The saying there
shall be no monopolies lessens the incitements to ingenuity, which is
spurred on by the hope of a monopoly for a limited time, as of 14.
years; but the benefit even of limited monopolies is too doubtful to be
opposed to that of their general suppression. '42 Thus, Jefferson did
not support granting limited monopolies to encourage research, let
alone have any intention to provide plenary power to authors to pro-
tect their works. Madison argued the countervailing viewpoint in his
response letter, dated October 17, 1788. 4 3 Madison's viewpoint was
that monopolies were acceptable, insofar as they would encourage re-
search and creation:
With regard to Monopolies they are justly classed among the great-
est nusances [sic] in Government. But is it clear that as encourage-
ments to literary works and ingenious discoveries, they are not too
valuable to be wholly renounced? Would it not suffice to reserve in
all cases a right to the public to abolish the privilege at a price to be
specified in the grant of it? Is there not also infinitely less danger of
this abuse in our Governments than in most others? Monopolies
are sacrifices of the many to the few. Where the power is in the few
it is natural for them to sacrifice the many to their own partialities
and corruptions. Where the power, as with us, is in the many not in
the few, the danger can not be very great that the few will be thus
of the people of the United States to learn from it." L. Ray Patterson & CraigJoyce,
Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning the Founders' View of the Copyright Power Granted to
Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, 52 EMORY L.J. 909, 940
(2003). He proceeds to list "the three constitutional copyright policies: (1) to pro-
mote learning ... ; (2) to provide public access ... ; and (3) to protect the public
domain .... " Id. at 946. By leaving out author's rights from this list, Professor Patter-
son reaffirms and strengthens his contention that the purpose of the Copyright
Clause is to promote learning, rather than to protect authors' rights. See id. at
936-50.
40 1 PATRY, supra note 29, at 23 ("[S]ome delegates opposed the statutory estab-
lishment of monopolies.").
41 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson, to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in 14 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: 8 OCTOBER 1788 TO 26 MARCH 1789, at 440 (Julian P.
Boyd ed., 1958).
42 Id. at 443.
43 Letter from James Madison, to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 13 id., at
16 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1956).
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favored. It is much more to be dreaded that the few will be unnec-
essarily sacrificed to the many. 44
Madison, therefore, felt that the grant of a monopoly was acceptable,
but he couched this opinion in terms of cultivating more knowledge
and creativity. Thus, the more favorable perspective on copyright pro-
tection lies with Madison, who merely argues for encouragements, not
for a total grant of rights to authors or inventors.
Additionally, the purpose of the clause can be gleaned from
other writings of James Madison. In The Federalist, Madison, referring
to the power provided in the clause, stated that the "utility of this
power will scarcely be questioned. ' ' 45 He continued, "The copyright
of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right
of common law. . . .The public good fully coincides . ..with the
claims of individuals."4 6 "[This] document[ ] prove[s] that Madison
accepted traditional English ideas of copyright. That is, he under-
stood copyright as a monopoly granted for only a limited term.
4 7
Therefore, even though, in presenting the Copyright Clause to the
people of New York in The Federalist, he explained it in terms of a
natural right, he merely did this to persuade the people to accept
copyright despite their antipathy toward monopolies and Great Brit-
ain.48 Madison's purpose in the clause, then, was to provide incen-
tives to authors to continue to promulgate their work and to continue
to research, not to provide authors with plenary rights to their works.
Thus, the "Founding Fathers understood the nature of copyright as a
monopoly that was granted for administrative purposes to promote
the sciences, and they adopted copyright law after modifying its doc-
trine to suit American taste."49
Finally, the purpose of the clause can be found in the first Copy-
right Law and in early case law regarding copyrights. The first Copy-
right Law, the Copyright Act of 1790,50 was entitled "An act for the
encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and
books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times
therein mentioned. '5 1 Although the text of the statute itself does not
mention learning, the subsequent case law affirms the suggestion
44 13 id. at 21.
45 THE FEDERALIST No. 43, supra note 11, at 309 (James Madison).
46 Id.
47 Hideaki Shirata, The Origin of Two American Copyright Theories: A Case of the Recep-
tion of English Law, 30 J. ARTS MGMT. L. & Soc'Y 193, 201 (2000).
48 Id. at 201-02.
49 Id. at 202.
50 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
51 Id.
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found in the title-that the act was intended to promote learning.
This conclusion is demonstrated by two common occurrences in early
case law. First, the Copyright Clause and Copyright Act were not re-
ferred to as such, but as "that provision of the constitution which gives
Congress power to promote the progress of science and the useful
arts"52 and "the act for the promotion of useful arts. '53 By referring to
the Copyright Clause and the Copyright Act in this manner, the Court
demonstrated that the Clause and the Act were not referred to as
methods of providing copyrights, but as methods of promoting the
useful arts. Thus, these references in early cases demonstrate that the
purpose of the Copyright Clause and the Copyright Act was to pro-
mote the useful arts.
Second, the cases interpreted the three requirements for receiv-
ing a copyright, established in the Act of 1790, as necessary prerequi-
sites to obtaining the copyright.54 This means that the author
received no benefit unless he complied with all of the requirements.
If the author did not automatically receive the benefit, then it seems
that copyright was not considered an author's right, but merely a priv-
ilege afforded to authors. Further, all three of the original require-
ments, prior to the creation of a fourth in the Act of 1802, 55 promote
learning. These three requirements were to deposit a copy of the title
in the clerk's office, publish a record in the newspapers for four
weeks, and have a copy sent to the secretary of state. 56 At a time when
information traveled slowly and it was difficult to gain access to new
information and literature, these requirements provided for a method
of informing the public of the creation of new works and the dissemi-
nation of new information. Thus, these early cases show that the pur-
pose of the Copyright Clause, as well as the first Copyright Act, was to
promote learning.
This is not to say that the Copyright Clause does not offer protec-
tion to authors-it does. However, the protection afforded to authors
was "not for their personal characteristics, their labor, or their rela-
tionship to the work, but rather because, out of the available choices,
they are the least likely to wield tyrannical power."57 "The Framers
were willing to condone the suppression of copying, even if it was the
copying of expression, for limited times so that the market would pro-
52 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 221 (1824).
53 Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454, 503 (1818).
54 See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 662-65 (1834); Ewer v. Coxe, 8 F.
Cas. 917, 918-20 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1824) (No. 4584).
55 See Wheaton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 662-63.
56 Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
57 Hamilton, supra note 24, at 11.
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gress and the community benefit."58 Therefore, the ultimate purpose
of the Copyright Clause was to promote learning.
II. THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT: THE LAw,
THE PURPOSE, AND THE EFFECTS
A. The Law of the DMCA
Section 1201 falls within Title I of the DMCA. "Title I imple-
ments the two WIPO [World Intellectual Property Organization] trea-
ties."'59 The two original bills proposed in the House and in the
Senate "were premised on the assumption that existing United States
copyright law was largely consistent with the treaty obligations. '60 Al-
though this suggests that few changes would need to be made to the
copyright law, "alternative implementation bills were introduced ...
that addressed Internet copyright policy issues as well as WIPO Trea-
ties implementation." 61 These changes were incorporated into the
bill that finally passed both houses, to become the DMCA. 62 Subsec-
tion 1201(a) (1) (A) provides: "No person shall circumvent a techno-
logical measure that effectively controls access to a work protected
under this title." 63 Subsection 1201 (a) (2) provides:
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide,
or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, com-
ponent, or part thereof, that-(A) is primarily designed or pro-
duced for the purpose of circumventing a technological measure
that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title;
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other
than to circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls
access to a work protected under this tile; or (C) is marketed by
that person or another acting in concert with that person with that
person's knowledge for use in circumventing a technological mea-
sure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this
title.64
58 Id. at 12.
59 Dorothy Schrader, Digital Millennium Copyright Act, P.L. 105-304: Summary and
Analysis, in COPYRIGHT: CURRENT ISSUES AND LAws 131, at 134 (John V. Martin ed.,
2002) (referring to the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty); see also BELLIA ET AL., supra note 3, at 285 (asserting that the
DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions were "ostensibly intended to bring the United
States into compliance with the 1996 [WIPO] Treaty").
60 Schrader, supra note 59, at 132.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 133.
63 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2000).
64 Id. § 1201(a)(2).
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Finally, § 1201(b) provides:
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide,
or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, com-
ponent, or part thereof, that-(A) is primarily designed or pro-
duced for the purpose of circumventing protection afforded by a
technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright
owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof; (B) has only
limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to cir-
cumvent protection afforded by a technological measure that effec-
tively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work
or a portion thereof; or (C) is marketed by that person or another
acting in concert with that person with that person's knowledge for
use in circumventing protection afforded by a technological mea-
sure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this
title in a work or a portion thereof. -6 5
These provisions, collectively, are known as the anticircumvention and
antitrafficking provisions.66
B. The History and Purpose of the DMCA
Ostensibly, the purpose of the DMCA was to implement the two
WIPO treaties.6 7 The events that culminated in the Act began when
the "Working Group on Intellectual Property of the White House Na-
tional Information Infrastructure (NII) Task Force convened a series
of conferences exploring the copyright policy issues related to the NII
... and to international development of two new intellectual property
treaties."68 These conferences culminated in a report in September
1995, commonly referred to as the "White Paper."69 Bills were then
introduced in both houses that would have implemented the group's
recommendation, but these bills were not enacted. 70 Then, in 1996,
the two WIPO treaties were created. 71 Subsequent to the creation of
these treaties, bills were introduced in both houses, in order to imple-
ment the treaties; these bills "embodied the Administration's recom-
65 Id. § 1201(b)(1).
66 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 440, 444 (2d Cir. 2001);
Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 943, 967 (E.D.
Ky. 2003); BELLIA ET AL., supra note 3, at 280, 285.
67 See BELLIA ET AL., supra note 3, at 285; Schrader, supra note 59, at 134.
68 Schrader, supra note 59, at 131.
69 See id.; see also BELLIA ET AL., supra note 3, at 270 (discussing how the "White
Paper" recognized that digital copies can be perfect and that the Internet makes dis-
tribution of those copies less costly).
70 See Schrader, supra note 59, at 131.
71 See id. at 131-32.
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mended 'minimalist approach' to implementing legislation. '7 2 These
bills were not enacted as originally proposed, however, and the final
legislation included provisions that were not required to comply with
the WIPO treaties. 73
According to the report from the Committee on Commerce, the
"purpose of H.R. 2281, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998,
is to implement two international treaties (i.e., the 'Copyright Treaty'
and the 'Performances and Phonograms Treaty') signed by the
United States and more than 125 other countries before the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).'74 The report also states
that the committee sought "to protect the interests of copyright own-
ers in the digital environment, while ensuring that copyright law re-
main [sic] technology neutral." 75  In this regard, the "DMCA
criminalizes the dissemination of the information it encompasses on
the premise that it can be used to facilitate copyright infringement. It
is a pure 'burglar's tools' statute."76 Thus, the purpose of the Act was
not merely to implement the treaties, as Congress contends. It was
less altruistic than that. The purpose, in reality, was dual: to imple-
ment the treaties and to protect copyright holders. 77 This purpose is
problematic, however, in that it conflicts with the primary theory of
the Copyright Clause: the clause is designed to promote learning, but
the Act promotes authors' interests at the expense of the dissemina-
tion of knowledge. 78
72 See id. at 132.
73 See id. at 132-33.
74 H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 20 (1998).
75 Id. at 25.
76 Susan W. Brenner, Complicit Publication: When Should the Dissemination of Ideas
and Data Be Criminalized?, 13 ALB. L.J. ScI. & TECH. 273, 403 (2003).
77 This is actually somewhat overstating the purpose, because the treaties were
designed to protect authors, who are the copyright holders. See World Intellectual
Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. No. 105-17,
36 I.L.M. 65, 68 (1997), available at http://www.wipo.org/eng/diplconf/distrib/94dc.
htm [hereinafter Copyright Treaty] (expressing the contracting parties' desire "to
develop and maintain the protection of the rights of authors in their literary and
artistic works in a manner as effective and uniform as possible"); World Intellectual
Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S.
TREATY DOc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 76, 81 (1997), available at http://www.loc.gov/
copyright/wipo/treaty2.html [hereinafter Performances Treaty] ("Contracting Par-
ties shall accord the protection provided under this Treaty to the performers and
producers of phonograms who are nationals of other Contracting Parties."). Thus,
the "dual" purposes of the DMCA are really the same thing: to protect copyright hold-
ers and to protect copyright holders.
78 See infra Part III.
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C. The Effects of the DMCA
The effect of these provisions of the DMCA has been in accord
with the efforts of Congress: it prohibits both circumvention of tech-
nological locks on copyrighted materials and trafficking in any device
that allows circumvention. 79 "The DMCA is clear that the right to pro-
tect against unauthorized access is a right separate and distinct from
the right to protect against violations of exclusive copyright rights
such as reproduction and distribution. ' 80 This newly-created right
does cover the intended conduct, by banning devices that facilitate
copyright infringement.8 1 The right does not stop there, however; it
also proscribes apparatuses that are not used for piracy, so long as
they can be used to circumvent some access control imposed by the
author.8 2 Moreover, the DMCA also creates incentives which operate
in opposition to the purpose of the Copyright Clause, by deterring
potential authors from either researching in the first place or dissemi-
nating their research after it has been conducted. 83 This topic will be
explored in more detail in Part VIII.
III. THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE AND THE DMCA: A LACK
OF CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY
The growth and development of the Internet has already had a sig-
nificant positive impact on the access of American students, re-
searchers, consumers, and the public at large to informational
resources that help them in their efforts to learn, acquire new skills,
79 See generally Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001)
(prohibiting defendant from publishing, or providing links to sites that published,
code that allowed users to bypass encryption on DVDs, as it was a violation of the
DMCA); Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 943
(E.D. Ky. 2003) (granting plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction against de-
fendant to stop production of microchips which bypassed plaintiff's authentication
sequence on toner cartridges); RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. C99-2070P,
2000 WL 127311 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000) (enjoining defendants from producing
the Streambox VCR, a product that violated the DMCA by enabling users to bypass
access and copy controls in plaintiffs product); Sony Computer Entm't Am., Inc. v.
GameMasters, 87 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (enjoining defendant from manu-
facturing or selling a product which violated the DMCA by permitting users to play
unauthorized video games on plaintiffs console).
80 Lexmark, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 969.
81 See, e.g., id.
82 See, e.g., GameMasters, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 987.
83 For examples, see ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, UNINTENDED CONSE-
QUENCES: FIVE YEARS UNDER THE DMCA 1 (2003), available at http://www.eff.org/IP/
DMCA/unintendedconsequences.pdf.
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broaden their perspectives, entertain themselves, and become more
active and informed citizens. 84
These effects of the Internet, while not precisely achieving the
purpose of the Copyright Clause, do indirectly provide that outcome.
This result is realized through learning that is made possible by the
dissemination of information provided for by the Internet.85 The
clause's goal is to promote learning. Therefore, the Internet, and the
digital technology and dissemination of information that make the In-
ternet function, promote the aims of the clause.8 6 The DMCA, how-
ever, prevents the free dissemination of information, both on the
Internet and in the physical world.8 7
A. The Current Copyright Clause Jurisprudence
Interpretations of the Copyright Clause by courts have varied
since the time of the Constitution, but not significantly. A few exam-
ples will demonstrate how the acknowledged primary purpose of the
Copyright Clause, to promote learning, has not materially changed.
First, in 1879, approximately one hundred years after the drafting of
the Constitution, the Supreme Court restated the purpose of the
clause and the intention of the Copyright Act in Baker v. Selden.8 8 At
that time, the Court recognized that "[t] he very object of publishing a
book on science or the useful arts is to communicate to the world the
useful knowledge which it contains."8 9 The Court also stated that the
Copyright Act "was not intended for the encouragement of mere in-
84 H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 35 (1998).
85 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 226 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stat-
ing that one of the two purposes of the Copyright Clause is the "overriding interest in
advancing progress by adding knowledge to the public domain").
86 See L. Ray Patterson, The DMCA: A Modern Version of the Licensing Act of 1662, 10
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 33, 51 (2002) (arguing that the goal of the Copyright Clause is the
promotion of learning, and that "the public domain is more important for the promo-
tion of learning than the protection of original works").
87 See id. at 52 (stating that the DMCA is constitutionally deficient because "it is
anti-learning, anti-public domain, and anti-access"); Jason Sheets, Copyright Misused:
The Impact of the DMCA Anti-Circumvention Measures on Fair & Innovative Markets, 23
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 20-21 (2000) ("Innovation is further damaged be-
cause of the direct reduction in access that results from the DMCA. Knowledge is
cumulative; creative works build on previous creative works. However, the DMCA
protects mechanisms that are designed to prevent access to knowledge.") (footnotes
omitted).
88 101 U.S. 99, 103, 105-06 (1879).
89 Id. at 103.
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dustry, unconnected with learning and the sciences." 90 Thus, the pur-
pose of copyright was still acknowledged to be promotion of learning.
The Supreme Court again reaffirmed this purpose in 1932: "The sole
interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the
monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the
labors of authors."9 1 This shows that the purpose is not to reward
authors, but to promote learning, which is the benefit provided to the
public by copyright law.
In 1979, the Fifth Circuit slightly altered the formulation given to
the purpose of the clause: "The words of the copyright clause of the
constitution do not require that writings shall promote science or use-
ful arts: they require that Congress shall promote those ends."9 2 This
expression does not require an act of Congress to force each individ-
ual grant of a copyright to promote learning, but merely requires that
the overall effect of any act of Congress be to promote learning. This
means that acts of Congress pursuant to the Copyright Clause must be
analyzed based on the total effect generated by the act, and whether
or not the act violates the purpose of the clause depends on whether
the act creates more impediments or benefits to the promotion of
learning.93 Thus, although the Fifth Circuit changed the expression
of the test, it only clarified the purpose of the clause: to have an over-
all effect which promotes learning.
Finally, this purpose has been reconfirmed in the mid-1980s. The
Supreme Court stated that "[t]he immediate effect of our copyright
law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the
ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the
general public good."94 This statement maintains that copyright law is
intended to promote learning. Thus, the purpose of the Copyright
Clause, according to current jurisprudence, is perceived to be the
same as the purpose at the time of the Founders. To sum up:
"[T] here is abundant authority that the primary purpose of the clause
is to promote the arts and sciences for the public good, not to grant
an economic benefit to authors and inventors."95
90 Id. at 105 (quoting Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999, 1003 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829)
(No. 2872)).
91 Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
92 Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 859-60 (5th
Cir. 1979).
93 See id. at 860.
94 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984)
(quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).
95 Ladd v. Law & Tech. Press, 762 F.2d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 1985).
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B. Congress's Underlying Purpose in Enacting
the DMCA Is Unconstitutional
The inclusion of the DMCA in Title 17 of the United States Code,
home to the Copyright Act, and portions of the House Report on the
DMCA seem to suggest that Congress based its power for enacting the
DMCA on the Copyright Clause.96 According to the House Report on
the DMCA, "Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Consti-
tution authorizes the Congress to promulgate laws governing the
scope of proprietary rights in, and use privileges with respect to, intan-
gible 'works of authorship.'- 97 The Committee on Commerce then
recognized that "the fundamental goal is '[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts."' 98 These two statements, when combined,
show that Congress is authorized, by the Constitution, to grant rights
to copyright holders for the purpose of promoting learning.99 Ac-
cording to the House Committee on Commerce, "Congress has histor-
ically advanced this constitutional objective by regulating the use of
information-not the devices or means by which the information is
delivered or used by information consumers-and by ensuring an ap-
propriate balance between the interests of copyright owners and infor-
mation users." 100
Congress, in enacting the DMCA, did not feel constrained to
limit itself to this constitutionally acceptable method of achieving the
Copyright Clause's purpose, however. Congress claimed that the
"DMCA had as its primary purpose the goal of updating United States
copyright laws with an eye toward making them more relevant and
flexible given the ever changing digital information climate." 101 The
seemingly benign motivation of this assertion is belied, however, by
two statements in the House Report. First, "the Committee... recog-
nize[d] that the digital environment poses a unique threat to the
rights of copyright owners, and as such, necessitates protection against
devices that undermine copyright interests."'102 Second, and worse,
96 See generally Brief of Amici Curiae Intellectual Property Law Professors in Sup-
port of Defendants-Appellants, Supporting Reversal, Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (No. 00-9185), available at http://www.eff.org/
IP/Video/MPAA DVDcases/20010126_ny-lawprofsamicus.html#inrst [hereinafter
IP Law Professors' Brief].
97 H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 24 (1998).
98 Id.
99 For a more thorough discussion of the purpose of the Copyright Clause, see
supra Part I.
100 H.R. Rrp. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 24.
101 Quinn, supra note 1, at 53.
102 H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 25.
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the "Committee thus [sought] to protect the interests of copyright
owners in the digital environment, while ensuring that copyright law
remain [sic] technology neutral."1 0 3 Although authors may benefit
from copyright laws, "the public is the intended beneficiary."10 4
When considered in the context of who is to benefit from the DMCA,
these statements show that the purpose of the DMCA, protecting cop-
yright holders, while a laudable goal, is not in accord with the powers
granted to Congress by the Copyright Clause.105
Although this goal is an objective that the Copyright Clause
achieves, it is not the intention of the clause, it is merely a collateral
effect. Therefore, although copyright holders may be accorded some
protections, the purpose of any act promulgated pursuant to the Cop-
yright Clause must be to promote learning. This conclusion is bol-
stered by the recognition of Justice Stevens in Eldred v. Ashcroft,10 6
when, after noting that the purposes of the Copyright Clause are "en-
couraging new inventions" 10 7 and "advancing progress by adding
knowledge to the public domain,"'08 he asserted that "[b]ecause those
twin purposes provide the only avenue for congressional action under
the Copyright/Patent Clause of the Constitution, any other action is
manifestly unconstitutional." 10 9
103 Id.
104 Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REv. 1095, 1098 (2003).
105 See Craig Allen Nard, The DMCA 's Anti-Device Provisions: Impeding the Progress of
the Useful Arts?, 8 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'V 19, 20 (2002) ("In fact, the anti-circumvention
provisions aim to prevent activity far beyond that which would constitute copyright
infringement.").
106 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107 Id. at 226 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109 Id. at 227 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This point, though made by the dissent, is
not really contradicted by the majority. The majority recognized that the Copyright
Clause is both a grant and a limitation of power and that the primary purpose of
copyright is to promote progress. Id. at 212. However, the court found that they were
"not at liberty to second-guess congressional determinations and policy judgments of
this order, however debatable or arguably unwise they may be." Id. at 208. There-
fore, without actually saying that it was constitutional, the court held that they could
not conclude that the Copyright Term Extension Act was impermissible. Id.
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C. The DMCA's Protection Is Over-Inclusive,
and Thus Is Unconstitutional"0
As discussed above,'11 the powers conferred on Congress by the
Copyright Clause are limited in scope. In order for an act of Congress
to be based on the authority of this clause, then, it too must be lim-
ited, and it must be limited to activity that may permissibly be regu-
lated under the clause. This scope is limited to protection of original
expression, and does not include ideas or processes.1 1 2 Nor does it
encompass facts or unoriginal compilations.' 13 Finally, any protection
must be limited in duration, as it may only extend for "limited
Times."'1 4 "A law that protects informational goods without regard
for these limitations cannot claim the Intellectual Property Clause as
its authority."' 15
The protections the DMCA affords to copyright holders are not
appropriately limited in scope, however.1 16 They are not restricted by
time.1 17 Further, "both copyrightable and uncopyrightable materials
will be covered by the anticircumvention right."'1 18 Thus, unoriginal
works, facts, unoriginal compilations, and ideas are all protected,
solely on the basis of being bundled under a technological "lock" with
a work that may be copyrighted. This means that the rights author-
ized to be provided by the Copyright Clause are being extended, by
the DMCA, to works outside of the clause's coverage. Moreover, de-
vices are prohibited by the DMCA before being put to any use at all. 1 9
110 Some of the arguments presented in this section have been argued before the
Second Circuit. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
The issues were not resolved in that case, however, as the court refrained from
considering them. Id. at 444-45 (refusing to consider whether the DMCA "exceeds
the constitutional authority of Congress to grant authors copyrights for a 'limited
time,'" because the arguments were improperly presented and were not ripe).
Further, other cases involving the constitutionality of the DMCA, for example, United
States v. Elcom, Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002), are discussed below. See
infra Part VI.
111 See supra Part I.
112 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000); see also IP Law Professors' Brief, supra note 96;
Burk, supra note 104, at 1099.
113 See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344-46 (1991);
Burk, supra note 104, at 1108.
114 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
115 IP Law Professors' Brief, supra note 96 (citing The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S.
82, 93-94 (1879)).
116 See IP Law Professors' Brief, supra note 96; Burk, supra note 104, at 1107-08.
117 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201; Burk, supra note 104, at 1108.
118 Burk, supra note 104, at 1108.
119 See IP Law Professors' Brief, supra note 96.
2133
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Prior to a device actually being put to use, it is hard to see how it could
violate any valid copyright concern. These effects show that copyright
protection has been expanded far beyond any scope permitted by the
Copyright Clause. 120 The House Commerce Committee effectively
summed up the meaning of these effects: "these regulatory provisions
have little, if anything, to do with copyright law."1 21 This leads to the
conclusion that the ability of Congress to enact the DMCA cannot
stem from the Copyright Clause, as the DMCA fails to restrict the pro-
tections granted to authors to the sphere of authority of the clause.
D. The Strictures of the DMCA Are Neither Necessary nor Proper
to the Copyright Clause
The Necessary and Proper Clause provides Congress with the
power to make any law which is necessary to carry out one of its other
enumerated powers. 122 Chief Justice Marshall interpreted the scope
of the power conferred by this clause in McCulloch v. Maiyland:I23 "Let
the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution,
and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of
the constitution, are constitutional."' 24 Limits contained within one
enumerated power prohibit Congress from acting beyond those limits
under the authority of another power. Thus, the Necessary and
Proper Clause may not be employed to bypass the limits contained in
the other enumerated powers. 125
The Copyright Clause contains limits on the authority it grants to
Congress. 126 Therefore, although the Necessary and Proper Clause
grants Congress the power to enact regulations designed to imple-
ment the purpose of the clause, these regulations must be restricted
to encompass only works covered by the clause. Congress, in enacting
120 See Burk, supra note 104, at 1107-08 (suggesting that the anticircumvention
provisions extend protection beyond the constitutional bounds permissible under the
Copyright Clause).
121 H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 23-24 (1998).
122 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the forego-
ing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.").
123 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 420-21 (1819).
124 Id. at 421 (emphasis added).
125 See IP Law Professors' Brief, supra note 96 ("Congress may not use the neces-
sary and proper power to avoid clear limits on its other enumerated powers under the
pretext of advancing them.").
126 See supra Part 1.
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the DMCA, did not abide by these restrictions. 2 7 Due to the DMCA's
extension of protection beyond the bounds authorized by the Copy-
right Clause, Congress could not have enacted the DMCA under the
Necessary and Proper Clause in conjunction with the Copyright
Clause.
Furthermore, even if the Necessary and Proper Clause did permit
Congress to legislate beyond the strictures of the Copyright Clause,
the DMCA would still not actually be necessary or proper. It would
not be necessary because, as recent cases involving the music industry
have demonstrated, 12 3 the copyright holder may still vindicate his
rights through copyright law other than the DMCA. Without the
DMCA, discovery of copyright law violators may require more effort by
the copyright holder, but vindication of these rights is still possible.
Moreover, the DMCA would not be proper because it allows copyright
holders to establish control over devices not included in the grant of
copyright. An example of this control is DVD regional encoding,
wherein a copyright holder for a movie may require the DVD pur-
chaser to also purchase a DVD player from a particular geographical
region.1 29 This control extends beyond the grant of the copyright
over the movie and other work on the DVD to control over the DVD
player purchased by the consumer. The DMCA facilitates this control
by preventing circumvention of this regional encoding, which would
otherwise be possible. Therefore, the DMCA cannot be justified as
necessary and proper to effectuate the grant of authority in the Copy-
right Clause.
Protecting copyrighted works is an enumerated power of Con-
gress. This power, however, is not plenary-it is limited by the pur-
pose of the Copyright Clause as well as restrictions contained within
the clause. Thus, Congress may only justify regulations designed to
protect authors and/or their works based on this clause if the regula-
tions comport with these limitations. The DMCA, however, extends
beyond these restrictions to protect works outside the scope of the
clause. The House Committee's motive for enacting the DMCA, that
"marketplace realities may someday dictate a different outcome, re-
sulting in less access, rather than more, to copyrighted materials that
are important to education, scholarship, and other socially vital en-
127 See supra Part III.B.
128 See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002)
(upholding a shut-down order against Napster based on the likelihood of findings of
contributory and vicarious copyright infringement by Napster).
129 SeeJim Taylor, DVD Frequently Asked Questions (and Answers) § 1.10, DVD DEMYS-
TIFIED, at http://www.dvddemystified.com/dvdfaq.html#1.10 (last updated Feb. 9,
2004).
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deavors,"' 30 indicates a valid goal (the protection of access to copy-
righted materials) of the clause. However, the DMCA, the statute
enacted to effectuate this goal, falls outside the bounds of Con-
gress's authority under the Copyright Clause and is therefore
unconstitutional.
IV. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE DMCA: STILL No AUTHORITY
The report of the House Committee on Commerce suggests that
Congress may not have relied on the Copyright Clause, but rather the
Commerce Clause, to enact the DMCA.131 "The Committee has a
long-standing interest in addressing all issues relating to interstate and
foreign commerce, including commerce transacted over all electronic
mediums, such as the Internet, and regulation of interstate and for-
eign communications. This legislation implicates each of those inter-
ests in numerous ways." 132 The belief of Congress evidenced by this
statement, that the Commerce Clause provided it with authority to
enact the DMCA, is erroneous. First, the Commerce Clause cannot be
utilized to circumvent the limitations contained within the Copyright
Clause.' 33 Second, assuming that the Copyright Clause did not pro-
hibit the regulations contained in the DMCA, they still could not be
enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause, because the regulated ac-
tivity is not "commerce."1 34 Finally, the failure of the DMCA to meet
the standards of the current test of constitutionality under the Com-
merce Clause 135 further demonstrates that the Act could not be
promulgated under that clause. 136
A. The Commerce Clause Cannot Save a Regulation Prohibited
by the Copyright Clause
The Constitution creates a federal government of limited and
enumerated powers. a37 This enumeration presupposes that there are
powers not granted to the national government. It also presupposes
that none of the powers may be utilized in a manner that would cause
130 H.R. RPp. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 36 (1998).
131 See id. at 22.
132 Id.
133 See infra Part V.A.
134 See infra Part IV.B.
135 The current test was established by the seminal case of United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995), and clarified by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). See
infra Part IV.C.2.
136 See infra Part IV.C.
137 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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another power to become superfluous. 138 The Framers enumerated
powers for a reason; there was a purpose behind each power granted
to Congress in Article I. Moreover, no power conferred to Congress
grants it a plenary right to regulate. Each power contains limitations
on the authority of Congress to use that power to regulate. Therefore,
since none of the powers are superfluous, no power has the ability to
confer authority to Congress that is prohibited by another power.1
3 9
The Framers understood these principles, and consciously exploited
them when drafting the Constitution. James Madison confirmed the
Framers' understanding of these principles when refuting the argu-
ment that "the power 'to lay and collect taxes .. .' amounts to an
unlimited commission to exercise every power: 14
°
But what color can the objection have, when a specification of
the objects alluded to by these general terms immediately follows,
and is not even separated by a longer pause than a semi-colon? If
the different parts of the same instrument ought to be so ex-
pounded, as to give meaning to every part which will bear it, shall
one part of the same sentence be excluded altogether from a share
in the meaning; and shall the more doubtful and indefinite terms
be retained in their full extent, and the clear and precise expres-
sions be denied any signification whatsoever? For what purpose
could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted, if these
and all others were meant to be included in the preceding general
power? Nothing is more natural nor common than first to use a
138 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803):
If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where
the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and original
jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the dis-
tribution ofjurisdiction, made in the constitution, is form without substance.
It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to
be without effect; and, therefore, such a construction is inadmissible, unless
the words require it.
Id.; Cf Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 35 (2003) ("A
statutory interpretation that renders another statute superfluous is of course to be
avoided."); Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 562 (1990) ("Our
cases express a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render su-
perfluous other provisions in the same enactment."); Mackey v. Lanier Collection
Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 837 & n.11 (1988) (noting that Supreme Court
jurisprudence is hesitant to interpret a congressional enactment so that it renders
another part of the same law superfluous and providing citations to previous cases).
139 See Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468-69 (1982);
United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1280 (11th Cir. 1999); IP Law Professors'
Brief, supra note 96.
140 See THE FEDERALIST No. 41, supra note 11, at 300 (James Madison).
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general phrase, and then to explain and qualify it by a recital of
particulars. But the idea of an enumeration of particulars which
neither explain nor qualify the general meaning, and can have no
other effect than to confound and mislead, is an absurdity, which, as
we are reduced to the dilemma of charging either on the authors of
the objection or on the authors of the Constitution, we must take
the liberty of supposing, had not its origin with the latter. 14 1
In the context of the DMCA, the Copyright Clause prohibits Congress
from enacting legislation to protect copyrights and copyright holders
unless it promotes science and the useful arts.1 42 Exploitation of the
Commerce Clause to achieve such legislation would negate the restric-
tion embodied in the Copyright Clause, rendering it superfluous,
which may not be done. 143 Thus, the Commerce Clause cannot pro-
vide Congress with the authority to enact the DMCA.
The Supreme Court, in Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gib-
bons,14 4 acknowledged that Congress may not employ one power to
eliminate a restriction on its authority under another power. In that
case, the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Co. had been or-
dered to discontinue its service and abandon its system, due to insuffi-
cient funds. 145 The railroad was not required to pay out for employee
labor protection. 146 Congress responded by enacting the Rock Island
Railroad Transition and Employee Assistance Act (RITA), which re-
quired payment by the Rock Island Trustee to employees not hired by
other carriers. 47 The Court held the statute unconstitutional, be-
cause it was not uniform, as required by the Bankruptcy Clause of the
Constitution. 4  The Court also held that the statute could not be
141 Id. at 301.
142 See supra Part III.A.
143 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 588-89 (1995) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) ("An interpretation of cl. 3 that makes the rest of § 8 superfluous simply cannot
be correct."); Brief of Amici Curiae Copyright Law Professors in Support of Plaintiffs
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Partial SummaryJudgment at 11, 321 Studios
v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2003) (No. C 02-1955 SI),
available at http://wwv.eff.org/IP/DMCA/MGM-v321Studios/20030314_321amicus
_brief.pdf [hereinafter Copyright Law Professors' Brief] ("[T]he Commerce Clause
may not be used to abrogate limits on the intellectual property power. Neither Con-
gress nor this Court may adopt a construction of any power enumerated in Article I
that would nullify limits on other Article I powers, or render other Article I powers
superfluous.").
144 455 U.S. 457 (1982).
145 See id. at 459-60.
146 See id. at 460.
147 See id. at 461-62.
148 See id. at 471.
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enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause. 149 This holding was based
on the reasoning that "if we were to hold that Congress had the power
to enact nonuniform bankruptcy laws pursuant to the Commerce
Clause, we would eradicate from the Constitution a limitation on the
power of Congress to enact bankruptcy laws." 150 The reasoning of this
Court shows that Congress may not circumvent an affirmative restric-
tion on its power by resorting to use of a power that lacks the
limitation.
The question of "whether Congress can use its Commerce Clause
power to avoid the limitations that might prevent it from passing the
same legislation under the Copyright Clause" was addressed by the
Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Moghadam.15 ' That court stated,
"legislation which would not be permitted under the Copyright Clause
could nonetheless be permitted under the Commerce Clause, pro-
vided that the independent requirements of the latter are met."'1 52
The court took as a given, however, "that there are some circum-
stances . . . in which the Commerce Clause cannot be used by Con-
gress to eradicate a limitation placed upon Congress in another grant
of power." 153 The court then concluded that the statute at issue in the
case was not fundamentally inconsistent with the Copyright Clause,
and, further, that "[e]xtending quasi-copyright protection also fur-
thers the purpose of the Copyright Clause to promote the progress of
the useful arts by securing some exclusive rights to the creative au-
thor."154 The court, by specifically discussing how the issue was not
"fundamentally inconsistent" with the Copyright Clause, created a pre-
sumption that a statute would not be valid under the Commerce
Clause if it was "fundamentally inconsistent" with the Copyright
Clause.155
Applying the rationale of these cases to the DMCA, it would be
reasonable to conclude that Congress could not employ the Com-
merce Clause as authority to enact the DMCA. The Copyright Clause
prohibitions on Congress include an affirmative limitation: copyright
laws must "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." 156 The
149 See id. at 468-69, 473 ("To hold otherwise would allow Congress to repeal the
uniformity requirement from Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, of the Constitution.").
150 Id. at 468-69.
151 United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1277 (11th Cir. 1999).
152 Id. at 1278.
153 Id. at 1280.
154 Id.
155 See IP Law Professors' Brief, supra note 96 (citing Moghadam, 175 F.3d at
1280-82).
156 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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DMCA does promote progress, in an indirect manner. This occurs by
way of increasing the incentives of authors to create, by giving them
more authority over their creations. It also impedes progress, how-
ever, by inhibiting the dissemination of information. This effect ac-
crues in two ways. First, authors would not have access to as much
information, because previous authors can prevent access by using ac-
cess controls, which cannot be circumvented, and can also prevent
copying with copy controls, which cannot be circumvented except by
those few who know how to circumvent them on their own. This
means that there is less knowledge in the public domain from which
to work. Thus, even if this knowledge can be paid for, it will be more
difficult to find, since it is not in the public domain, and it will not be
accessible to those who cannot afford it. Second, authors would be
afraid to publish many works, for fear of prosecution under the
DMCA. Although most authors would not be subject to the DMCA
any more than they would be to ordinary copyright law, it creates an
additional risk that a previous author will claim that the new author's
work violates copyright law, based on material that is protected in the
first author's work by a copy or access control. Thus, the total effect is
to impede progress, because, although the first generation of authors
would produce more, this material would then be unavailable for sub-
sequent generations, thereby reducing overall progress and overall
learning.1 57 Therefore, allowing Congress to employ its Commerce
Clause power to enact the DMCA would eliminate a restriction on the
power of Congress from the Constitution. Because this may not be
done, Congress could not enact the DMCA pursuant to the Com-
merce Clause.
B. The Activity Regulated by the DMCA Is Not Within the
Definition of "Commerce "158
Congress's power to regulate commerce arises from the Com-
merce Clause. 159 The requirements of this clause can be divided into
two elements: (1) there must be "commerce," and (2) it must be
amongst the States or with a foreign nation. If either of these two
157 See infra Part VII.
158 This section considers the intention of the Framers in the creation and
understanding of the Commerce Clause. Recognizing the nuance of recent Supreme
Courtjurisprudence in this area, this section limits its analysis to the understanding of
.commerce" at the time of the Framing, prior to the development of the current,
more intricate jurisprudence.
159 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power... To regu-
late Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the In-
dian Tribes.").
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elements is not met, the Commerce Clause does not provide authority
for the regulation in question, which is thereby unconstitutional.
The first element requires the activity being regulated to involve
"commerce." Black's Law Dictionary defines commerce as "It] he ex-
change of goods and services." 160 Substituting this definition for com-
merce in the language of the clause shows that it grants Congress the
power to regulate the exchange of goods and services. It follows that
there must be an exchange in order for Congress to regulate pursuant
to the Commerce Clause,1 61 and it is this requirement that prohibits
Congress from claiming authority to enact the DMCA pursuant to the
clause.
The DMCA prohibits both circumvention of technological mea-
sures that control access to an author's work and trafficking in or
manufacturing devices designed to circumvent a technological mea-
sure created to protect an author's work.162 One element is conspicu-
160 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 263 (7th ed. 1999). For purposes of this analysis, the
current definition of "commerce" has been employed. This definition is similar, but
not exactly equivalent to, the definition of commerce as of the drafting of the Consti-
tution. At that time, "'commerce' consisted of selling, buying, and bartering, as well
as transporting for these purposes." United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-86
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (including citations to three dictionaries from the
late 1700s).
161 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584-93 (Thomas, J., concurring). In his opinion, Justice
Thomas presents an analysis of the original understanding of the Commerce Clause,
whereby the modern meaning of the word "commerce" is shown to be inconsistent
with the Founders' intention in choosing that term. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
This is demonstrated by the use of the term "commerce" at the time of the drafting,
and also by the fact that "interjecting a modem sense of commerce into the Constitu-
tion generates significant textual and structural problems." Id. at 586-87 (ThomasJ,
concurring). The conclusion of this argument is that congressional power pursuant
to the Commerce Clause should be limited to authority to enact regulations which are
consistent with the original meaning of that clause. See id. at 584 (ThomasJ, concur-
ring). This meaning would require an exchange between two persons and would not
permit regulation based on manufacture. Cf id. at 586 (Thomas, J., concurring)
("[T]he term 'commerce' was used in contradistinction to productive activities such
as manufacturing and agriculture."). Whether this distinction still makes sense or not,
the scope of congressional authority is limited to that which is granted by the Consti-
tution, and that grant, if not evident from the text, is determined by the drafters'
intent. See NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 23, 484 U.S.
112, 123 (1987) ("On a pure question of statutory construction, our first job is to try
to determine congressional intent, using 'traditional tools of statutory construction.'
If we can do so, then that interpretation must be given effect, and the regulations at
issue must be fully consistent with it."); Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 843 n.9 (1984) (requiring courts to give effect to
congressional intent in statutory construction).
162 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
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ously absent from the statute: any requirement of two parties. The
statute imposes liability merely when an individual person either cir-
cumvents a technological restraint or manufactures a device capable
of this circumvention. Yet a single person cannot "exchange" an arti-
cle of commerce with himself; an "exchange" requires at least two
people. This means that the DMCA does not require an exchange.
From this, it follows that the DMCA does not implicate commerce,
and that the DMCA does not fall within the purview of the Commerce
Clause.
Moreover, even those portions of the DMCA that do apply to ex-
changes are outside the bounds of the Commerce Clause. This result
flows from another provision of the exchange requirement. Ex-
change is defined as "[t]he act of transferring interests, each in con-
sideration for the other."163 Further, a legal interest is a "legal share
in something; all or part of a legal or equitable claim to or right in
property."'164 Combining these definitions to create an intelligible
standard results in the conclusion that there must be a transfer, be-
tween two or more people, of legal shares, claims, or rights in prop-
erty for activity to be classified as commerce. Evaluated under this
criterion, the provisions of the DMCA that necessitate more than one
person still fall outside the ambit of the Commerce Clause, because
these provisions do not involve any transferral of interest. For exam-
ple, one person can distribute works, after removal of the digital man-
agement system, without receiving anything in return, and one person
can provide or offer to the public any device which is designed prima-
rily for circumvention without receiving anything in return. In
neither situation is there a transference of interests by a party in con-
sideration for the transference from the other party. Therefore, there
is no exchange, no implication of commerce, and no authority for the
DMCA pursuant to the Commerce Clause.
C. The DMCA Is Beyond Congress's Authority Under the
Lopez/Morrison Test
The inconsistent judicial determinations of, and tests for, the
scope of the Commerce Clause since its inception have been the sub-
ject of vast discussion. 165 The current test was formulated in United
States v. Lopez16 6 and clarified in United States v. Morrison.167 An analy-
163 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 160, at 585 (omitting additional defini-
tions that are irrelevant in the current context).
164 Id. at 816.
165 See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552-61.
166 Id. at 558-59.
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sis of both the history of the scope of the Commerce Clause power
and the current test reveals that the DMCA is not a valid regulation
pursuant to the clause.
1. Implications of Commerce Clause History for the DMCA
Over the past two centuries, the Court's view of the Commerce
Clause power has drifted away from its original understanding.1 68
This expansion of the authority granted to Congress can be seen from
a brief overview of the case law. Originally, the commerce power did
not include the ability to regulate in the fields of agriculture or manu-
facturing.1 69 Commerce was strictly limited to exchange or trade.1 7 0
This view was adopted by the Supreme Court over a century after the
Founding, in United States v. E.C. Knight Co.' 71 In that case, the Court
formulated a test for whether an activity implicates commerce. First,
the Court distinguished manufacture from commerce:
Doubtless the power to control the manufacture of a given thing
involves in a certain sense the control of its disposition, but this is a
secondary and not the primary sense; and although the exercise of
that power may result in bringing the operation of commerce into
play, it does not control it, and affects it only incidentally and indi-
rectly. Commerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part of
it.172
The Court continued on to declare that manufacturing does not nec-
essarily implicate commerce: "[t]he fact that an article is manufac-
tured for export to another State does not of itself make it an article
of interstate commerce, and the intent of the manufacturer does not
determine the time when the article.., passes from the control of the
State and belongs to commerce.' 73 Finally, the Court suggested a
test, not actually accepted for another forty years, 174 for determining
167 529 U.S. 598, 611-12 (2000).
168 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring).
169 See THE FEDERALIST No. 34, supra note 11, at 251 (Alexander Hamilton) (prov-
ing that agriculture and manufacture were to remain within the province of State
regulation by referring to these subjects as areas in which the states, and not the
federal government, would incur expenses).
170 See 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 361 (4th ed.
1773) (defining commerce as "Intercourse; exchange of one thing for another; in-
terchange of any thing; trade; traffick").
171 156 U.S. 1 (1895), overruled by NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1 (1937).
172 Id. at 12.
173 Id. at 13.
174 The test was accepted in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495 (1935), overruled by NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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whether an activity could be classified as commerce: any activity that
resulted in a direct interference with interstate or foreign commerce
was within the bounds of the Commerce Clause, and any activity
which indirectly interfered was not.175
Another seminal case in the Court's explication of the limits of
the federal power under the Commerce Clause is Hammer v.
Dagenhart176 In that case, the Court provided two governing princi-
ples for Commerce Clause jurisprudence. First, the Court analyzed
the ability of the commerce power to be used to prohibit activity. This
analysis began with the premise that "the power is one to control the
means by which commerce is carried on, which is directly the contrary
of the assumed right to forbid commerce from moving and thus de-
stroy it as to particular commodities.1 7 7 The Court then recognized
the argument that prohibition was a corollary power of regulation, but
it rejected this assertion: "the authority to prohibit is... but the exer-
tion of the power to regulate." 78 Finally, after assessing the existing
case law, the Court held that the commerce power could only be used
to prohibit an activity if the activity required use of interstate transpor-
tation and regulation of this transportation could only be achieved by
prohibiting the harmful conduct. 179 Second, the Court declared that
"the production of articles, intended for interstate commerce, is a
matter of local regulation."'1 80 In making this declaration, the Court
stated that manufacturing and mining are not commerce, even if the
items produced are to be shipped or used in interstate commerce. 181
This line of cases was continued in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States.182 In that case, the direct/indirect test suggested in E.C.
Knight was adopted. The Court found that "there is a necessary and
well-established distinction between direct and indirect effects."18 3
The significance of this distinction was then revealed: "[b]ut where
the effect of intrastate transactions upon interstate commerce is
merely indirect, such transactions remain within the domain of state
power. ' 184 Thus, the commerce power had been extended to cover
175 See E.G. Knight, 156 U.S. at 16.
176 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
177 Id. at 269-70.
178 Id. at 270.
179 See id. at 271.
180 Id. at 272.
181 See id. (citing Del., Lackawanna & W. R.R. Co. v. Yurkonis, 238 U.S. 439,
444-45 (1915)).
182 295 U.S. 495 (1935), overruled by NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937).
183 Id. at 546.
184 Id.
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purely intrastate activity, but only if it directly affected interstate
commerce.
To this point, the jurisprudence of Commerce Clause power had
not been significantly changed since the time of the Founding. This
trend was altered dramatically, however, by NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp.18 5 The case marked the beginning of a series of decisions
by the Court that involved a more expansive reading of the Com-
merce Clause.18 6 In Jones & Laughlin, the Court rejected a Commerce
Clause challenge to the National Labor Relations Act, holding that
"the act [was] valid as here applied." 18 7 In coming to this conclusion,
the Court diverged from the direct/indirect test, finding that the
"question is necessarily one of degree.' 8I 8 The Court also stated that
if activities "have such a close and substantial relation to interstate
commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that
commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be de-
nied the power to exercise that control." 89 This precedent granted a
virtually plenary power to Congress under the Commerce Clause for
almost sixty years, as no other statute or regulation was deemed to
violate the Commerce Clause until United States v. Lopez' 90 in 1995.
Thus, the first dramatic departure from the original meaning of the
Commerce Clause bestowed upon Congress a level of power, virtually
plenary, that would have been unheard of to the Founders.
This historical analysis of the development of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence implies that, whether or not the DMCA is valid under
the current interpretation of the Commerce Clause, it does not com-
port with the meaning of that clause over the first 150 years. 191 The
clause was understood by the Framers to be limited in scope, only
185 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
186 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 555-56 (1995).
187 301 U.S. at 49.
188 Id. at 37.
189 Id.
190 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68 (declining to further extend Congress's Commerce
Clause power and holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeded this author-
ity); see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw PRINCIPLES & POLICIES 174 (1997);
Joan T.A. Gabel, Escalating Inefficiency in Workers' Compensation Systems: Is Federal Reform
the Answer?, 34 -WAKE FOREST L. Rv. 1083, 1128-29 (1999); cf. George P. Ferro, Affect-
ing Commerce: Post Lopez Review of the Hobbs Act, 66 ALB. L. Rv. 1197, 1197 (2003)
("Until Lopez, Congress encountered few, if any, obstacles regulating intrastate activity
under the Commerce Clause.").
191 Cf Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring) (recognizing that Supreme
Court case law no longer conforms to "the original understanding of the Commerce
Clause").
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permitting regulation of exchanges between parties in different states;
for example, it was recognized that this authority did not extend to
manufacturing or agriculture, and did not permit prohibitions on in-
trastate activity unless prohibiting the activity, which must require use
of interstate commerce, was the only feasible regulatory method. This
meaning remained relatively stable for the following 150 years.
The DMCA both regulates manufacturing and prohibits intra-
state activity that does not require use of interstate commerce. Thus,
the historical jurisprudence of the Commerce Clause suggests that the
DMCA is not within the permissible sphere of Commerce Clause au-
thority, because its operation is antagonistic to the purpose of the
clause. The purpose of the clause remains constant, even if the test
for comporting with that purpose changes; as articulated by Justice
Thomas, "[e] ven though the boundary between commerce and other
matters may ignore 'economic reality' and thus seem arbitrary or arti-
ficial to some, we must nevertheless respect a constitutional line that
does not grant Congress power over all that substantially affects inter-
state commerce."
192
2. The DMCA and the Current Test for Constitutionality Under
the Commerce Clause
a. Lopez and Morrison: The Test
The current formula for determining whether a statute is validly
enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause was established in Lopez,
where the Court "identified three broad categories of activity that
Congress may regulate under its commerce power." 93 Congress may
regulate: (1) "the use of the channels of interstate commerce," 194 (2)
"the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from in-
trastate activity,"' 9 5 and (3) "activities having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce .. . i.e., those activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce."' 9 6 The Court also suggested that the inclusion
in a statute of ajurisdictional element could assist the Court in finding
that the regulation involved the requisite effect on interstate
commerce.
19 7
192 Id. at 593 (Thomas, J., concurring).
193 Id. at 558.
194 Id.
195 !d.
196 Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted).
197 See id. at 561-62.
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Five years later, the Court clarified the third prong of this
formula in United States v. Morrison.1 98 First, the Court reaffirmed the
activity in question must be economic in nature. 199 Second, the Court
provided a stronger incentive to include a jurisdictional element in
statutes: "[s] uch a jurisdictional element may establish that the enact-
ment is in pursuance of Congress' regulation of interstate com-
merce."2 0 0 With the inclusion of these two clarifications, the current
test is complete.
Depicted as a formula, the test looks like this:
The statute in question is valid if:
(1) it regulates a channel of commerce, or
(2) it regulates the instrumentalities of commerce, or
(3) it regulates intrastate commerce, and
(a) the regulated activity is
(i) economic in nature, or
(ii) essential to a larger regulation of economic activ-
ity, and
(b) the regulated activity substantially affects interstate
commerce.
Note: A jurisdictional element may prove the existence of (a)
or (b) in a situation where the existence of one of these two
elements is difficult to ascertain.
Therefore, for the DMCA to be constitutional under the Com-
merce Clause, it must pass one of the three prongs of this test.
b. The DMCA Fails the First Two Prongs
The DMCA does not involve either a "channel" or an "instrumen-
tality" of commerce. A "channel" is "a mode of transmitting some-
thing."20 1 None of the actions enumerated in the DMCA, including
circumventing, manufacturing, importing, offering to the public, pro-
viding, and trafficking, are prohibitions on channels of commerce.
These are all actions which potentially utilize the channels of com-
merce, but are not themselves the channels of commerce. Further, an
198 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
199 See id. at 611 ("[I]n those cases where we have sustained federal regulation of
intrastate activity based upon the activity's substantial effects on interstate commerce,
the activity in question has been some sort of economic behavior.").
200 Id. at 612.
201 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 160, at 226.
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"instrumentality" is a "thing used to achieve an end or purpose.
Again, the prohibited actions are not instrumentalities of commerce.
These actions may occasionally use instrumentalities, but are not in-
strumentalities themselves, as they are actions, not things used for a
purpose. Therefore, because the prohibitions are all actions, they are
neither channels nor instrumentalities of commerce, and the DMCA
fails the first two prongs.
Furthermore, the first provision, prohibiting circumvention of ac-
cess controls, does not necessarily involve interstate activity.20 3 Cir-
cumvention of technological protections does not require action by
more than one person or movement across a state boundary by an
individual working alone. 20 4 Without multiple actors, or an individual
actor who crosses the border between states, there can be no inter-
state activity. 205 As the first two prongs-regulation of channels of
commerce and regulation of the instrumentalities of commerce-ne-
cessitate interstate activity,20 6 the DMCA fails both prongs.
c. The DMCA Fails the Third Prong
Because the DMCA failed the first two prongs of the Lopez/ Morri-
son test, it falls under the category of the third prong: regulation of
intrastate commerce.207 To pass the third test, the DMCA must regu-
late economic activity which substantially affects interstate commerce.
This requires proof (1) that the regulated activity is either economic
in nature or is essential to a larger regulation of economic activity,
and (2) that it substantially affects interstate commerce.
The DMCA does not regulate economic activity. The DMCA reg-
ulates the circumvention of technological protections, the manufac-
202 Id. at 802.
203 See infra Part IV.B.
204 The idea here is that an individual actor, working alone, can stay in one loca-
tion while circumventing a protection or creating a device or method that is capable
of circumvention.
205 "Interstate" is defined as "[b]etween two or more states or residents of differ-
ent states." BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY, supra note 160, at 826. For conduct to consti-
tute "interstate" activity, it must involve more than one state.
206 "Commerce" in this context refers to interstate commerce, and thus requires
interstate activity.
207 Technically, this is incorrect. The regulated activity must be proven to be com-
merce prior to any other analysis under this part of Lopez/Morrison. However, be-
cause this Note has already advanced the proposition that the DMCA does not
regulate commerce, see infra Part IV.B, the analysis in this subsection assumes that the
activity regulated is commerce. Further, as demonstrated earlier, see supra Part
V.C.2.b, the regulated activity does not fall under interstate commerce and it must be
intrastate commerce, thereby invoking the third prong of the test.
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ture of devices to circumvent technological protections, and
distribution of/trafficking in such devices. To be economic in nature,
the activities would have to be such that there was no purpose for the
activity that was not economic.20 8 However, § 1201 (a) (1)(A),
§ 1201 (a) (2) (A), and § 1201 (b) (1) all prohibit non-economic activity.
One effect of prohibiting circumvention of access controls is to forbid
an individual from developing her own methods of accessing her pro-
grams or security systems. Security systems, such as password protec-
tion on computers and computer programs or security codes to home
alarms or garage doors, are copyrighted materials that control access
to the protected computer, program, or house. Therefore, bypassing
these controls would violate the DMCA, because it would entail a cir-
cumvention of an access control. However, creating one's own
method of access to one's own belongings, when the method was not
provided by the manufacturer, does not implicate any economic activ-
ity. For example, if a person develops his own garage-door opener, he
thereby circumvents the access controls present in the opener pro-
vided by the manufacturer. 20 9 The owner already owns the garage
door and opener, and he has the right to be able to enter his own
garage. Therefore, unless he paid for use of that specific opener, as
opposed to paying for the garage door system, developing his own
opener would not implicate any economic concerns. This same analy-
sis would apply for any security system, such as home security systems
or password protections for computers and computer programs. All
security systems involve access controls (as their purpose is to restrict
access), and owners of these systems do not implicate anything eco-
nomic in nature if they bypass these controls to access their own
possessions.
Furthermore, creating or distributing devices that enable circum-
vention of access controls or circumvention of copy controls, under
§ 1201 (a) (2) and § 1201 (b), is not necessarily economic in nature. As
seen above, an individual can circumvent an access control without
208 "Nature" is defined, in relevant part, as "[a] fundamental quality that distin-
guishes one thing from another; the essence of something." BLACK'S LAw DICTION-
ARY, supra note 160, at 1050. This means that, to be economic in nature, the essence
of the thing described would have to be economic; its fundamental quality must be
economic.
209 This example is based on an actual case, wherein the defendant company de-
veloped a universal opener that could operate the plaintiffs garage door system, de-
spite the access control system included in the plaintiffs opener. See Chamberlain
Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Ill. 2003). In that case,
the court granted the defendant's motion for partial summaryjudgment, thereby dis-
missing the DMCA claims. Id. at 1046.
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implicating economic concerns. Further, circumvention of a copy
control, which is not a violation of the DMCA, is also not economic.
An individual can circumvent a copy control on a CD to make an
MP3, and, unless the person purchased the actual plastic of the CD,
this act is not economic in nature, as the person has paid for rights to
the music. Accordingly, if an individual's act is not economic in na-
ture, then manufacturing, offering to the public, importing, and pro-
viding a device that enables an individual to accomplish that act also is
not economic in nature. Unless the person offering, importing, man-
ufacturing, or providing the device is receiving something in return
for the device, there is nothing economic about the transaction, and
there is nothing economic about an individual using the device.
There is one portion of § 1201 (a) (2) and § 1201 (b) that is eco-
nomic in nature: trafficking in devices capable of circumventing ac-
cess controls or copy controls. By definition, trafficking must be
economic, because it involves an exchange of goods for goods or
money.210 Therefore, this portion of each of these provisions passes
the third prong of the test for Commerce Clause power. This one
constitutional component of the statute cannot save the rest of the
statute, however. Therefore, § 1201, as a whole, still fails a constitu-
tional analysis.
The above examples demonstrate that the regulated activities are
not economic in nature, but are they essential to a larger regulation of
economic activity? No, because the larger regulation-protection of
copyrights and copyright holders-can be accomplished without
them. These regulations were enacted to make copyright enforce-
ment easier, but they are not essential. The same purpose could be
achieved by stricter enforcement of copyright laws, or by requiring
any device that enables the circumvention of technological protec-
tions to log when it is used and what the purpose of that use was.
Therefore, since the DMCA does not regulate activity that is economic
in nature or essential to a larger regulation of economic activity, it
does not satisfy the first requirement of the third prong.
As for the second requirement, the DMCA does have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. Although this effect is attenuated, the
DMCA passes the substantial effects test. However, this is a moot
point, as it must pass both elements of the third prong in order to be a
valid statute pursuant to the Commerce Clause, and it has already
failed the first element.
There is one final consideration. The presence of a jurisdictional
element could provide the requisite connection to economic activ-
210 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 160, at 1502.
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ity.211 This possibility does not, however, help the DMCA, because the
Act has no such element. Therefore, the DMCA fails the third prong
of the test for constitutionality under the Commerce Clause. This fail-
ure means that the DMCA fails the overall test and cannot be enacted
under the Commerce Clause.
V. THE TREArY POWER AND THE DMCA: THE LAST HOPE FAILS
The final possible source of congressional authority for enacting
the DMCA is the treaty power.2 12 Congress purportedly created the
DMCA to implement two treaties of the World Intellectual Property
Organization, 2 13 the WIPO Copyright Treaty214 and the WIPO Per-
formances and Phonograms Treaty.2 1 5 Neither treaty required the en-
actment of the DMCA. Although the purpose was legitimate, the
resultant statute was not.
A. The Source and Scope of the Treaty Power
The treaty power of Congress is a derivative power, which comes
from three clauses in the Constitution: the Treaty Clause,216 the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause, 217 and the Supremacy Clause.218 The
Treaty Clause grants authority to the president: "[The President] shall
have power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties . *.".."219 Thus, Congress is granted no authority to
create or enter into treaties, merely to offer advice and consent to the
Executive. Congress is, however, granted the power to effectuate trea-
ties entered into by the President. Congress has the authority "[t]o
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Con-
stitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
211 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000).
212 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
213 H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 20 (1998). The House Committee on Com-
merce stated that, "[t] he purpose of H.R. 2281, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
of 1998, is to implement two international treaties (i.e., the "Copyright Treaty," and
the "Performances and Phonograms Treaty") signed by the United States and more
than 125 other countries before the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO)." Id.
214 Copyright Treaty, supra note 77.
215 Performances Treaty, supra note 77.
216 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
217 Id. art. I, § 1, cl. 18.
218 Id. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
219 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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Officer thereof."220 Thus, the application of the Necessary and
Proper Clause to the Treaty Clause allows Congress to promulgate any
law necessary to execute the terms of the treaties entered into by the
President and ratified by the Senate. Finally, these laws, once passed,
are the supreme law of the land: "This Constitution, and the Laws of
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land ... ,"221
This, however, still leaves one question unanswered: what is the
scope of Congress's treaty power? May Congress assume power, in or-
der to effectuate a treaty, which it does not otherwise possess? Or that
would otherwise be prohibited? The answers to these questions, as
seen below, are yes, Congress has more power under the treaty power
than it would otherwise possess, but no, it may not exercise the treaty
power in order to lay claim to authority that is specifically prohibited
to it by the Constitution.
The scope of the treaty power has been determined in a series of
cases by the Supreme Court. An overview of a few of these cases, fol-
lowed by the seminal case of Missouri v. Holland,222 demonstrates how
much additional authority the treaty power confers on Congress. In
Ware v. Hylton,223 the Court determined that a statute enacted by Con-
gress, pursuant to the treaty of peace signed with Great Britain, invali-
dated a Virginia statute which confiscated the debt owed to British
citizens. 224 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Chase stated that "[i] t
seems to me that treaties made by Congress, according to the Confed-
eration, were superior to the laws of the states." 225 He continued, "[a]
treaty cannot be the supreme law of the land, that is of all the United
States, if any act of a State Legislature can stand in its way."226 Thus,
after Ware, it was clear that there was a treaty power vested in Congress
to promulgate legislation to give effect to treaties, and that any law
enacted pursuant to this power was superior to any state law.
220 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added).
221 Id. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2; see also Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 236 (1796)
(declaring all laws made pursuant to a treaty are the supreme law of the land, and are
thereby superior to any state law, even state laws enacted prior to creation of the
treaty).
222 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
223 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 199.
224 See id. at 245.
225 Id. at 236.
226 Id. (emphasis omitted).
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The next case, Geofroy v. RiggS,2 2 7 discussed some limits on the
treaty power. Although the Court, on its way to holding that the
French nephews of a deceased American were entitled to the uncle's
real property,22 8 found the treaty in issue, which allowed for inheri-
tance of property in the United States by aliens where they were per-
mitted to hold real estate, to be valid, 22 9 it did provide a limit to the
power:
The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms un-
limited except by those restraints which are found in that instrument
against the action of the government or of its departments, and
those arising from the nature of the government itself and of that of
the States. It would not be contended that it extends so far as to authorize
what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of govern-
ment or in that of one of the States, or a cession of any portion of
the territory of the latter, without its consent.230
This means that the treaty power is limited, not to the powers expressly
granted to the federal government by the Constitution, but to those
powers which are not affirmatively prohibited to the federal government.
Thus, Congress may enact laws under the treaty power that it would
otherwise not have the authority to enact, but only if they do not con-
flict with a prohibition on congressional authority contained else-
where in the Constitution.2 31
The scope of the treaty power, and the limitation articulated in
Geoftoy v. Riggs, was clarified in Missouri v. Holland,232 where the Court
227 133 U.S. 258 (1890).
228 See id. at 272-73.
229 See id. at 267.
230 Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
231 See also Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (10 Wall.) 211, 243 (1872). In referring to the
treaty power, the Court stated:
[I]t must be assumed that the framers of the Constitution intended that it
should extend to all those objects which in the intercourse of nations had
usually been regarded as the proper subjects of negotiation and treaty, if not
inconsistent with the nature of our government and the relation between
the States and the United States.
Id.; cf In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 463 (1891) ("The treaty-making power vested in our
government extends to all proper subjects of negotiation with foreign
governments.").
232 252 U.S. 416 (1920). It has been suggested that this case is no longer good law.
See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MiCH. L. REv. 390
(1998); Thomas Healy, Note, Is Missouri v. Holland Still Good Law? Federalism and the
Treaty Power, 98 COLUM. L. Rv. 1726 (1998). This possibility does not negatively ef-
fect the analysis presented in this Note, however, as the claim is that the treaty power
is less plenary than previously believed.
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upheld a treaty protecting migratory birds and its implementing legis-
lation.233 The Court began by noting that it was
said that a treaty cannot be valid if it infringes the Constitution, that
there are limits, therefore, to the treaty-making power, and that one
such limit is that what an act of Congress could not do unaided, in
derogation of the powers reserved to the States, a treaty cannot
do.2
3 4
However, the court then reasoned that there are matters over which
Congress has authority pursuant to a treaty which it would not have in
the absence of a treaty. 23 5 The Court then upheld the treaty in ques-
tion because it did "not contravene any prohibitory words to be found
in the Constitution."236 Finally, the Court laid out a sort of test for
whether the treaty power extends additional authority to Congress:
"the question is whether the United States is forbidden to act."23 7
This means that so long as the Constitution does not affirmatively re-
strict Congress from enacting legislation, any legislation is permissible
under the treaty power if enacted to effectuate a valid treaty.238
B. The DMCA, the WIPO Treaties, and the Treaty Power
The DMCA purports to implement the requirements of two
WIPO treaties: 23 9 the Copyright Treaty240 and the Performances and
Phonograms Treaty.24 1 The most innovative requirements of the trea-
ties are contained in two articles, which appear in both treaties with
233 Holland, 252 U.S. at 435.
234 Id. at 432.
235 Id. at 433.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 435.
238 See also Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Federal and State Powers Under the UN Covenant on
Human Rights, 1951 Wis. L. REv. 389, 430 ("What Missouri v. Holland did was to estab-
lish the validity of Acts of Congress which were called for by a valid treaty or helped
carry it out, even though the power of Congress to enact domestic legislation about
the same matters was absent or doubtful.").
239 See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 20 (1998); see also BELLIA ET AL., supra note
3, at 285 ("The DMCA's anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions were osten-
sibly intended to bring the United States into compliance with the 1996 World Intel-
lectual Property Organization ('WIPO') Copyright Treaty ...."); JOHN V. MARTIN,
COPYRIGHT: CURRENT ISSUES AND LAWS 134, 135, 137 (2002) (stating that "Title I im-
plements the two WIPO treaties," and then discussing how this was accomplished);
WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRAcrICE (Supp. 2000), available at http://
digital-law-online.info/patry/patryll.html#sec2 ("Title I of the DMCA implements
the WIPO treaties.").
240 See Copyright Treaty, supra note 77.
241 See Performances Treaty, supra note 77.
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the same tides and almost identical language. The first relevant arti-
cle in each treaty is entitled "Obligations concerning Technological
Measures." 2 42 The language employed in the Copyright Treaty, which
is almost identical to the Performances and Phonograms Treaty, is:
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and ef-
fective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective techno-
logical measures that are used by authors in connection with the
exercise of their rights under this Treaty or the Berne Convention
and that restrict acts, in respect of their works, which are not au-
thorized by the authors concerned or permitted by law.2 43
The second article presenting innovative material is "Obligations con-
cerning Rights Management Information." 24 4 The language of this ar-
ticle in the two treaties differs by only the inclusion of the phrase "or
the Berne Convention" in the Copyright Treaty.2 45 This language, in
relevant part, states: "Contracting Parties shall provide adequate and
effective legal remedies against any person knowingly performing any
of the following acts knowing, or with respect to civil remedies having
reasonable grounds to know, that it will induce, enable, facilitate or
conceal an infringement of any right covered by this Treaty."246
The DMCA is Congress's effort to implement these treaties.
"These provisions [§ 1201 of the DMCA] require contracting parties
to provide 'adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies
against the circumvention of effective technological measures that are
used by authors.., and that restrict acts ... which are not authorized
by the authors concerned or permitted by law.' "247 Thus, the DMCA
endeavors to implement the two innovative articles of both treaties in
one statute.
242 Copyright Treaty, supra note 77, art. XI, 36 I.L.M. at 71; Performances Treaty,
supra note 77, art. XVIII, 36 I.L.M. at 86.
243 Copyright Treaty, supra note 77, art. XI, 36 I.L.M. at 71. This same provision
appears in the Performances and Phonograms Treaty, but with "performers or pro-
ducers of phonograms" in place of "authors," without "or the Berne Convention," and
with "performances or phonograms" substituted for "works." Performances Treaty,
supra note 77, art. XVIII, 36 I.L.M. at 86.
244 Copyright Treaty, supra note 77, art. XII, 36 I.L.M. at 71; Performances Treaty,
supra note 77, art. XIX, 36 I.L.M. at 86.
245 Copyright Treaty, supra note 77, art. XII, 36 I.L.M. at 71.
246 Performances Treaty, supra note 77, art. XIX, 36 I.L.M. at 86.
247 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-796, at 63-64 (1998) (quoting WIPO treaties).
2155
2156 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 79:5
C. Unnecessary Legislation: U.S. Copyright Law Already
Effectuated the Treaties
Any legislation enacted by Congress pursuant to the treaty power
must be targeted at implementing a valid treaty. 248 This means that,
in order for the treaty power to authorize Congress to pass legislation,
the provisions of the treaty in question must necessitate implementing
legislation. Under the treaty power, Congress only has the power to
promulgate laws which are "necessary and proper"249 to effectuate a
valid treaty. The treaty power is not a blank check given to Congress
to pass any statute which it desires to pass, but is a limited grant of
additional authority to promote international agreements. Therefore,
the DMCA is only a valid application of the treaty power if it is neces-
sary to carry out the obligations imposed by the WIPO treaties.
To determine if the DMCA is required to implement the WIPO
treaties, it is necessary to compare the obligations under the treaty to
the pre-DMCA state of the copyright law:
The WIPO Copyright Treaty articulates two specific subject matters
to be protected by copyright: computer programs in any mode or
form, and compilations of data or material in any form which con-
stitutes an intellectual creation. It also recognizes three explicit
rights of authors: the right of distribution, the right of rental, and
the right of communication to the public. The treaty clarifies the
scope and duration of protection of works and allows contracting
nations the liberty to enact some exceptions to its protection. The
WIPO treaty also details its obligations concerning rights manage-
ment information and administrative particulars concerning the
treaty's ratification and enforcement. While the above portions of
the treaty enhance copyright law, they are not gross variations from
the traditional standards of copyright protection. 250
This synopsis of the WIPO treaty displays how U.S. copyright law prior
to the DMCA was sufficient to implement the requirements of the
treaty. U.S. copyright law clearly complied with all articles except Arti-
cles XI and XII of the Copyright Treaty and Articles XVIII and XIX of
the Performances and Phonograms Treaty.25 '
Articles XI and XII of the Copyright Treaty and Articles XVIII
and XIX of the Performances and Phonograms Treaty require some-
248 See U.S CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; supra text accompanying notes 219-24.
249 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added).
250 Terri Branstetter Cohen, Note, Anti-Circumvention: Has Technology's Child
Turned Against Its Mother?, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 961, 972-73 (2003) (citations
omitted).
251 See Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-
Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 531 (1999).
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what more analysis. These articles require protection of technological
measures and rights management information systems. 25 2 Thus, they
effectively require signatory countries to prevent circumvention of
technological protections imposed by authors. However, "[t] he U.S.
could have asserted that its law already complied with the WIPO
treaty's anti-circumvention norm."253 Anticircumvention was already
established by a number of statutes and judicial decisions.25 4 This
leads to the conclusion that copyright law already provided adequate
protection to copyright holders. 255 Thus, "l[t] o comply with the WIPO
treaties, the U.S. did not need to make any substantive changes to the
U.S. Copyright Act."25 6
The extent to which the provisions of the DMCA exceed the re-
quirements of the WIPO treaties provides another reason why the
DMCA is not necessary for the treaties' implementation. The obliga-
tions imposed on signatory nations by Articles XI and XII of the
WIPO Copyright Treaty, and Articles XVIII and XIX of the Perform-
ances and Phonograms Treaty, are limited in scope. Requirements
for protection of technological measures are limited to measures used
by authors (or performers) "in connection with the exercise of their rights
unde' 257 the treaties and "which are not... permitted by law."258 This
makes it unnecessary for the United States to enact any laws protect-
ing copyright holders beyond the rights provided in the treaties or to
prevent circumvention of technological measures which restrict acts
permitted by law. The rights afforded to copyright holders by the
treaties are virtually equivalent to the rights contained in the pre-
DMCA copyright laws. Extra protection, afforded by measures which
exceed the scope of copyright protection, is therefore unnecessary for
implementation of the treaties. Moreover, there are acts which are
permitted by law, such as fair uses, that do not need to be prevented
in order to satisfy treaty obligations. The DMCA protects measures
which cannot be validly protected under copyright law259 and does
252 See Copyright Treaty, supra note 77, arts. XI-XII, 36 I.L.M. at 71; Performances
Treaty, supra note 77, arts. XVIII-XIX, 36 I.L.M. at 86.
253 Samuelson, supra note 251, at 531.
254 See id. at 532.
255 See id.
256 Quinn, supra note 1, at 53; see also Samuelson, supra note 251, at 521 ("[T]he
DMCA was largely unnecessary to implement the WIPO Copyright Treaty because
U.S. law already complied with all but one minor provision of that treaty.").
257 Copyright Treaty, supra note 77, art. XI, 36 I.L.M. at 71 (emphasis added);
Performances Treaty, supra note 77, art. XVIII, 36 I.L.M. at 86 (emphasis added).
258 Copyright Treaty, supra note 77, art. XI, 36 I.L.M. at 71 (emphasis added);
Performances Treaty, supra note 77, art. XVIII, 36 I.L.M. at 86 (emphasis added).
259 See infra Part III.B.
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not allow for fair uses or other legitimate circumventions. 260 There-
fore, the DMCA was not "necessary and propee' to implement any obli-
gations that may have arisen from Article XI of the Copyright Treaty
or Article XVIII of the Performances and Phonograms Treaty, as it is
overly broad in scope.
Justification for the DMCA under Article XII of the Copyright
Treaty (Article XIX of Performances and Phonograms Treaty) falters
under a similar analysis. The articles require prevention of enumer-
ated acts, related to the circumvention of electronic rights manage-
ment information, which "induce, enable, facilitate or conceal an
infringement of any right covered by this Treaty."261 This means that
implementing legislation need only protect the rights granted by the
treaties. This language also implies that protection must only be ex-
tended to preclude circumvention of electronic rights management
information systems that protect copyrightable works. In addition, it
is not necessary to provide remedies for circumvention of these sys-
tems which merely allowed for fair uses, as the copyright holder is not
granted a right by the treaties to prevent fair uses. The DMCA pro-
tects management information systems that protect uncopyrightable
work, provides remedies for circumvention of these systems for fair
uses, and protects against non-electronic management information
systems, when the treaty clearly demands only protection of electronic
systems. 2 6 2 Thus, the DMCA is also not necessary and proper for im-
plementation of this article in the treaties.
"[T]he DMCA went far beyond treaty requirements in broadly
outlawing acts of circumvention of access controls and technologies
that have circumvention-enabling uses."2 63 Congress could have en-
acted legislation that was more restricted, to better align with the obli-
gations of the treaties. An alternative bill offered by Representative
Tom Campbell provides an example, in that Congress might have
"proposed to make it illegal to circumvent a technical protection sys-
tem for purposes of engaging in or enabling copyright infringe-
260 See PATRY, supra note 239 ("[1]n some instances the public will be justified in
circumventing copy protection schemes in order to make fair use copies of a work.");
Samuelson, supra note 251, at 524 ("[T]here are far more legitimate reasons to cir-
cumvent a technical protection system than the DMCA's act-of-circumvention provi-
sion expressly recognizes.").
261 Copyright Treaty, supra note 77, art. XII, 36 I.L.M. at 71 (emphasis added);
Performances Treaty, supra note 77, art. XIX, 36 I.L.M. at 86 (emphasis added).
262 See Copyright Treaty, supra note 77, art. XII, 36 I.L.M. at 71; Performances
Treaty, supra note 77, art. XIX, 36 I.L.M. at 86.
263 Samuelson, supra note 251, at 521; see also MARTIN, supra note 239, at 137
(" [T] he DMCA exceeds the minimum treaty obligations since the WIPO Treaties re-
quire protection only for electronic rights management information.").
[VOL- 79:52158
2004] COPYRIGHT, CONGRESS, AND CONSTITUTIONALITY
ment."2 6 4 This proposal demonstrates both the overbreadth of the
DMCA and the recognition of this overbreadth by at least some mem-
bers of Congress.
That the DMCA was not necessary for implementing the WIPO
treaties was also recognized by the Clinton Administration. "Because
of the substantial accord between the WIPO treaty norms and existing
U.S. law, the Clinton Administration initially considered whether the
WIPO Copyright Treaty might even be sent to the Senate for ratifica-
tion 'clean' of implementing legislation."265 However, "[b] oth Con-
gress and the Clinton Administration used these international treaties
as an excuse for passing broad, sweeping changes to U.S. copyright
laws that were urged by the entertainment industry, despite the fact
that such changes to U.S. copyright law were not required by the trea-
ties themselves." 266 This is problematic when the source of Congress's
treaty power is considered, however. Because Congress derives its
power to enact implementing legislation from the Necessary and
Proper Clause, it is restricted to enacting laws that are actually neces-
sary and proper to effectuate the treaties in question. In the case of
the DMCA, this means that Congress had no authority under the
treaty power to enact these provisions, because the DMCA was neither
necessary nor proper to effectuate the obligations of the WIPO
treaties.
D. The Treaty Power Cannot Circumvent the Limits
in the Copyright Clause
Using the treaty power as the source of authority for enacting the
DMCA also runs into the same problem as using the Commerce
Clause. 267 No clause may be used to circumvent the limitations on
congressional power imposed by another clause. 268 Thus, the treaty
power, which is derived from the Necessary and Proper Clause, can-
not be employed to achieve an end prohibited by the Copyright
Clause.2 69 Because the DMCA is prohibited by the Copyright
Clause,2 70 Congress cannot enact it pursuant to the Necessary and
264 Samuelson, supra note 251, at 533.
265 Id. at 530 (footnote omitted).
266 Quinn, supra note 1, at 52 (footnote omitted).
267 See Part IV.A.
268 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
269 Cf IP Law Professors' Brief, supra note 96 ("[W] ith or without the treaty power
as a backstop, the Necessary and Proper Clause does not empower Congress to rede-
fine its own authority to avoid specific, affirmative limits on that authority.").
270 See supra Part III.
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Proper Clause, and, therefore, the DMCA is not constitutional pursu-
ant to the treaty power.
VI. CORLEY, FELTEN, ELCOMSOFT, AND 321 STUDIOS:
CONSTITUTIONALITY CONSIDERED?
A. The First Opportunity: Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley27a
Congress's constitutional authority to enact the DMCA was first
challenged in the case of Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley.272 The
appellants argued that the DMCA violated the stipulation that copy-
rights be granted for "limited times," and that Congress thereby ex-
ceeded its authority in enacting the statute. 273 The court dismissed
this argument without considering it, however, 274 reasoning that, be-
cause the argument was presented in a footnote, it was not entitled to
appellate consideration. 275 The fact that it was additionally argued in
an amicus brief did not help, because that "is normally not a method
for injecting new issues into an appeal."27 6 Additionally, the court
stated that the argument was not yet ripe for review.277 For these rea-
sons, the court did not take advantage of this opportunity to resolve
the constitutional issues.
B. A Second Chance: Felten v. Recording Industry Ass'n
of America, Inc.2 78
The question of whether Congress had authority to enact the
DMCA was next raised in the case of Felten v. Recording Industry Ass'n of
America, Inc. 279 The case resulted from a challenge issued by the Stra-
tegic Digital Music Initiative (SDMI), an organization funded by the
recording industry, to computer scientists, inviting them to crack the
prototypes of SDMI technologies. 2 80 Edward Felten, a professor of
271 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
272 Id.
273 Id. at 444-45.
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 Id.
278 No. CV-01-2669 (GEB) (D.NJ. 2001).
279 Id.
280 SeeJuLIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 593
(2002); see also Prof. Felton [sic] Challenges Constitutionality of DMCA Anticircumvention,
TECH LAW JOuRNAL DAILY E-MAIL ALERT (June 7, 2001), at http://www.techlawjour
nal.com/alert/2001/06/07.asp [hereinafter Prof. Felton] ("[T]he SDMI issued a 'Pub-
lic Challenge' to help choose among four proposed watermarking technologies.").
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computer science at Princeton University, accepted the challenge and
defeated the SDMI system. 28 1 Professor Felten and his team refused
the cash reward, because it would have required them to agree that
their research was the property of SDMI. 28 2 Professor Felten decided
instead to present his paper at a conference on computer science. 28 3
However, the recording industry contacted the conference organizers
and Princeton's legal counsel and warned that publication of the pa-
per would violate the DMCA.284 "The RJAA charged that if Felten
presented his research, he would violate the DMCA's anti-circumven-
tion trafficking provision, which prohibits the dissemination of infor-
mation on how to circumvent encrypted devices." 285 This warning led
Professor Felten to state: "On behalf of the authors of the paper
'Reading Between the Lines: Lessons from the SDMI Challenge,' I am
disappointed to tell you that we will not be presenting our paper
today. "286
Professor Felten further responded to this incident by filing suit
against the recording industry.287 Scholars theorized that this case
would present a "vehicle for constitutional challenges to the
DMCA."28 8 In their complaint, the researchers outlined the events
that had transpired leading to the creation of the research paper, de-
scribed how the threat of suit under the DMCA would impede their
research, and requested declaratory and injunctive relief, so that they
could publish their paper.289 In the fourth cause of action, the re-
281 COHEN ET AL., supra note 280, at 593; see also Prof. Felton, supra note 280 ("Fel-
ton [sic] responded, and successfully defeated all four technologies.").
282 COHEN ET AL, supra note 280, at 593.
283 Id.
284 Id.; see also Prof. Felton, supra note 280 (describing how the SDMI sent a letter to
Felten, warning him that publication could subject the researchers to actions under
the DMCA).
285 Cassandra Imfeld, Playing Fair With Fair Use? The Digital Millennium Copyright
Act's Impact on Encyption Researchers and Academicians, 8 COMM. L. & POL'Y 111, 138
(2003).
286 E-mail from Edward W. Felten, Professor, Princeton University, to sdmi-paper-
info@cs.princeton.edu (Apr. 26, 2001), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/
archive/dvd-discuss/msg12192.html. This statement also shows that even the threat
of suit under the DMCA can stifle dissemination of research. See infra Part VIII.
287 See First Amended Complaint, Felten v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. (D.NJ.
2001) (No. CV-01-2669 (GEB)), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/curriculum/
courseHomepages/spring2002/724_02/FeltenComplaint.pdf; see also Prof. Felton,
supra note 280 (noting that Professor Felten filed a complaint against the RIAA).
288 Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Sys-
tems, 15 I-IARv.J.L. & TECH. 41, 81 n.125 (2001).
289 See First Amended Complaint, Felten, CV-01-2669; see also Burk & Cohen, supra
note 288, at 81 n.125 ("Felten and his co-plaintiffs... seek declaratory and injunctive
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searchers specifically alleged that the "DMCA [e]xceeds Congress'
[e]numerated [p]owers. ' ' 290 The allegation also asserted a lack of
power under the Copyright Clause (referred to in the complaint as
the intellectual property power), the Necessary and Proper Clause,
and the Commerce Clause. 291 These claims, however, were never ar-
gued before the court, because the case was dismissed prior to
adjudication.
The case was dismissed after the RIAA and the Department of
Justice persuaded the court that the case was not ripe.29 2 This deci-
sion resulted from a combination of factors. First, after the research-
ers decided to withdraw their papers, the "RIAA immediately issued a
press release stating that it had never seriously intended to sue."293
Second, the "government stated in documents filed with the court in
November 2001 that 'scientists attempting to study access control
technologies' are not subject to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA). '"2 94 Finally, the recording industry claimed to agree with
this sentiment, noting they had "unequivocally and repeatedly stated
that we have no intention of bringing a lawsuit against Professor
Felten or his colleagues." 295 These arguments, along with the lack of
"evidence that the scientific speech of Professor Felten and his col-
leagues had been chilled,"29 6 convinced the court to dismiss the case.
This dismissal, coupled with the researchers' decision not to ap-
peal, 29 7 prevented the issues from being litigated in the court. There-
relief prohibiting enforcement of the DMCA's anti-device provisions to prevent them
from discussing and publishing their research findings on the efficacy of certain anti-
circumvention technologies.").
290 First Amended Complaint, Felten, CV-01-2669.
291 Id.
292 See COHEN ET AL., supra note 280, at 593.
293 Id.
294 Electronic Frontier Foundation, Security Researchers Drop Scientific Censorship
Case: Government, Industry Claim DMCA Not a Threat to Science (Feb. 6, 2002), at http://
www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/Felten-vRIAA/20020206_efffeltenpr.html.
295 Prof. Felton, supra note 280.
296 COHEN ET. AL, supra note 280, at 593. One reason behind the determination
that the researchers had not been chilled was the fact that they had already secured
another forum for publication of their paper. See First Amended Complaint, Felten,
CV-01-2669 (averring that USENIX Association had agreed to include the research in
its Security Symposium); see also COHEN ET AL., supra note 280, at 593 ("Professor
Felten also arranged to present his paper at a different research conference, the
Tenth USENIX Security Conference, and did so in August 2001.").
297 See COHEN ET. AL, supra note 280, at 593 ("Professor Felten and his counsel
elected not to appeal the dismissal."); Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 294
("Professor Edward Felten and his research team decided not to appeal the Novem-
ber dismissal of their case by a NewJersey Federal Court."); Weil, Gotshal & Manges
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fore, although this case articulated many of the constitutional issues
underlying the DMCA, it did not resolve any problems.
C. Another Missed Opportunity: United States v. Elcom Ltd.298
The courts were presented with a third chance to resolve the
question of whether Congress had constitutional authority to enact
the DMCA in another district court case, United States v. Elcom Ltd.299
This time, the court did address the issue of congressional authority
and the constitutionality of the DMCA. 300 The court concluded that
"Congress did not exceed its constitutional authority in enacting the
law." 30 1 Unfortunately, the district court only provided a cursory anal-
ysis of the question, thereby missing many of the issues and extending
its conclusion beyond the scope of its own analysis. Thus, "[w]ith all
due respect to the Elcom court, it was wrong."302
The district court began its analysis with its conclusion: "Congress
plainly has the power to enact the DMCA under the Commerce
Clause."30 3 The court then proceeded to provide a perfunctory analy-
sis in which it made assertions that proved its conclusion.30 4 However,
prior to getting into any level of actual analysis, the court made the
conclusory assertion that "[t]he DMCA prohibits conduct that has a
substantial effect on commerce between the states and commerce with
foreign nations. '30 5 This statement presupposes the assertion it is at-
tempting to prove, by merely restating the test for constitutionality
under Lopez. To provide support for this theory, the court discussed
§ 1201(b) and § 1204.30 6 However, whether or not these sections
could be enacted does not determine Congress's authority for the en-
tirety of the DMCA. To hold otherwise would be to grant Congress a
plenary power to legislate on any topic, so long as it addressed one
minor provision to interstate commerce. But this cannot be the case,
LLP, Litigation, WGM INTERNET LAW BULLETIN (Feb. 20, 2002), available at http://
www.weil.com ("Professor Felten and the Electronic Frontier Foundation decide not
to appeal the District Court of New Jersey's dismissal of their declaratory action seek-
ing a finding that publication of research studying access control technologies was not
in violation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.").
298 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
299 Id.
300 Id. at 1137-42.
301 Id. at 1141-42.
302 Susan W. Brenner, Complicit Publication: When Should the Dissemination of Ideas
and Data Be Criminalized?, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 273, 344 (2003).
303 Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1138.
304 See id.
305 Id.
306 Id.
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as the Constitution grants only limited and enumerated powers. 30 7
The assertion that these provisions in the DMCA legitimize the entire
statute cannot withstand scrutiny.
The court also attempted to provide another basis for its
conclusion:
To the extent that circumvention devices enable wrongdoers to en-
gage in on-line piracy by unlawfully copying and distributing copy-
righted works of authorship, the sale of such devices has a direct
effect on suppressing the market for legitimate copies of the works.
Accordingly, there is a rational basis for concluding that the regulated
activity sufficiently affects interstate commerce to establish that Con-
gress had authority under the Commerce Clause to enact the
legislation.308
This argument contains two fundamental flaws, both of which stem
from a misapplication of the Lopez test. First, the court used the
phrase "to the extent" in referring to the effect that circumvention
devices have on the market for copyrighted works. This phrase neces-
sarily implies the possibility that there are other uses which do not
effect the market for legitimate copies. The court, however, provided
no indication of the required extent to which devices must enable
piracy, because it provided no analysis of the uses of circumvention
devices or the frequency with which they are used for infringing activ-
ity or legitimate activity. Further, the DMCA does not restrict its
prohibitions to circumvention devices actually used to make copies that
are impermissible infringements of a copyrighted work. It merely pro-
vides a blanket prohibition on devices, without asking what they are
actually used for (regardless of the purpose for which they are created).
Second, the court completed its analysis of the Commerce Clause by
holding that it provides Congress with authority to enact the DMCA,
because there is "a rational basis for concluding" that there is a sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce. This conclusion rests on a mis-
understanding. The Lopez test requires an actual showing of
substantial effects on interstate commerce, not merely a rational basis
for concluding that there is an effect.30 9 This can be seen by the hold-
ing in Lopez itself, where, despite the acknowledged rational basis for
the conclusion that the gun control act at issue effected interstate
commerce, the Court determined that the rational basis was too attenu-
ated. The effect necessitated too many intermediate steps for Con-
307 See supra note 11.
308 Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1138 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
309 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
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gress to derive authority for the statute from the Commerce Clause.310
Therefore, the rational basis relied upon by the Elcom court, and the
analysis based on it, fails to provide an adequate basis for the conclu-
sion of the court.
The court continued in its analysis by addressing the issue of
"whether the DMCA is 'not fundamentally inconsistent' with the pur-
pose of the Intellectual Property Clause."311 On this issue, the court
began by accepting the reasoning of the government.3 12 This reason-
ing provided that the purpose of the Copyright Clause is to promote
arts and science, and protecting authors encourages them to create
and invent, so the protection of authors will promote arts and sci-
ences.313 However, this is a logical fallacy; the second step-that pro-
tecting authors encourages them to create and invent-does not
necessitate the conclusion. Just because authors are encouraged to
create and invent does not mean that the overall effect will be to pro-
mote arts and sciences. The problem with this analysis is that it disre-
gards important variables. No matter how many creations and
inventions are being produced, if they are not available to the public
or the information in them is not available for any type of use, the
progress of arts and sciences will be impeded. In this situation, al-
though the first generation of authors or inventors will produce more,
subsequent generations will be stifled by their inability to use any cur-
rent works to further their own research or creations. In other words,
the court did not follow the current "test" for whether an act of Con-
gress follows the purpose of the Copyright Clause, which requires the
court to look at the net results on promotion of learning by the act.314
Because the court did not follow the Lopez test, its decision appears to
lack legitimacy.
The court concluded its analysis of the constitutionality of the
DMCA by considering "whether the DMCA is nevertheless 'irreconcil-
ably inconsistent' with a limitation contained within the Intellectual
Property Clause. '3 15 The court held that it was not.3 16 This holding,
although technically correct, is cast into doubt upon investigation of
the practical effects of the DMCA. The problem arises in the effect of
preventing the creation and distribution of technological circumven-
tion measures. The court stated that "[u]pon the expiration of the
310 Id. at 563-64.
311 Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1140.
312 Id. at 1140.
313 Id. at 1140-41.
314 See supra Part III.A.
315 Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1141.
316 Id. at 1141-42.
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copyright, there is no longer any protectable intellectual property
right in the work's expression. '" 3 1 7 This is correct. The court contin-
ues, "[t]he publisher/copyright owner has no right to prevent any
user from using the work any way the user prefers. At best, the pub-
lisher has a technological measure embedded within the digital prod-
uct precluding certain uses of that particular copy of the work .... ,,318
This statement is also correct. However, the reality reflected in the
combination of these statements and the DMCA's provisions is that
any use of this copy not permitted by the copyright owner, even after
the copyright expires, will still be impossible for the majority of peo-
ple. Once the copyright expires, it is true that it is legal to circumvent
the technological protections to make fair use of the work.319 How-
ever, if no one has access to a device that is capable of doing this
circumvention, because they are all banned by the DMCA, how is
someone supposed to effectuate this right? This shows that, practi-
cally, if not theoretically, the DMCA effectively provides copyright
holders with a considerable amount of protection that is prohibited
under the Copyright Clause. 320 Therefore, the court, although seem-
ingly correct, erred by missing the effect of the DMCA.
Therefore, the district court failed to adequately analyze the issue
of whether Congress possessed constitutional authority for enacting
the DMCA. This failure resulted from the court's omitting an analysis
of a set of factors that influence the determination of the DMCA's
constitutionality, as demonstrated by the perfunctory and cursory
analysis employed by the court. Thus, the question of the congres-
sional authority for enactment of the DMCA was still not satisfactorily
answered after the courts' third opportunity to address the problem.
D. The Recent Case: 321 Studios v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios, Inc.32 1
Another recent opportunity to determine the constitutionality of
the DMCA, presented to U.S. District CourtJudge Susan Illston of the
317 Id. at 1141.
318 Id.
319 See id.
320 See Sheets, supra note 87, at 17. Protection is afforded because,
[w]hile it is true that an individual is not prohibited from circumventing
technical measures that control copying, an individual doing so must first
gain access to the work. The act of circumventing a measure that controls
access to a work for the sake of engaging in a fair use is still prohibited.
Id.
321 Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
Resolving Related Motions, 321 Studios v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. (N.D.
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Northern District of California, concluded in February. 322 In the case,
plaintiff 321 Studios sought a declaratory judgment that the program
it sold, which bundled an instruction manual with computer software
capable of copying DVDs, did not violate the DMCA.323 The plaintiff
allegedly brought suit because of threatened litigation by the defend-
ants and the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) .324 The
plaintiff claimed that its product allowed legal owners of DVDs to
make backup copies for their own personal use. 325 The company sup-
ported this claim by alleging that the "plastic disc is very sensitive to
scratches and cracks on the playing surface." 326 Further support, such
as the damaging effects of exposure to heat or light, was also pro-
vided.327 The complaint continued by reiterating that the purpose of
the product was to provide DVD owners with the ability to make archi-
val copies of their DVDs. Moreover, the product was allegedly only
capable of making lower quality copies of the actual film (not the en-
tire DVD), required use of a computer containing a legal and author-
ized DVD player, and was impractical to use to mass produce bootleg
copies of DVDs.3 28 In addition, the company informed users that the
software must not be used for improper purposes.3 29 Finally, the com-
plaint asserted that the provisions of the DMCA "are invalid because
Congress exceeded its enumerated powers under Article I, Section 8,
of the U.S. Constitution." 33 0
In response to the allegations of 321 Studios, the defendants,
consisting of a number of motion picture companies, 33 1 claimed that
321 Studio's products were "illegal under the DMCA."3 3 2 They also
sought "through this litigation to enjoin trafficking in those prod-
Cal. Feb. 19, 2004) (No. C-02-1955 SI), available at http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/
MGMv_321 Studios/20040219_Order.pdf.
322 See id.
323 See Complaint at 1-2, 321 Studios (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2004) (No. C-02-1955 SI),
available at http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/20021220 321studios-complaint.pdf.
324 Id. at 2.
325 See id. at 1.
326 Id. at 5.
327 Id.
328 Id. at 7-8.
329 Id. at 8.
330 Id. at 10. This claim also alleged that the product did not violate the DMCA,
that the DMCA provisions are unconstitutionally vague, and/or that the DMCA vio-
lates the First Amendment. Id.
331 These companies included Columbia Pictures, Disney, MGM Studios, the Saul
Zaentz Company, Sony Pictures, Time Warner, Tristar Pictures, and Universal City
Studios. Answer at 2, 321 Studios (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2002) (No. C-02-1955 SI), avail-
able at http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/20021220-mpaa-answer.pdf.
332 Id.
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ucts." 33 3 The defendants filed a counterclaim, alleging violations of
the DMCA and seeking a denial of 321 Studios' requested declaratory
judgment, a permanent injunction against 321 Studios for violating
the provisions of the DMCA, all profits received from the products
sold by 321 Studios, and their attorneys' fees, full costs, and
disbursements. 33 4
This suit presented the district court with a fourth opportunity to
determine whether Congress had the authority to enact the DMCA.
However, Judge Illston, in her order of February 19, 2004, concluded
that the DMCA is within the scope of congressional authority.3 35 This
result is not surprising. First, the failure to provide an adequate reso-
lution to this question was foreshadowed by Judge Illston's statement
that "she [was] 'substantially persuaded' by previous cases that the
software violates the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act."336 Judge
Illston also "said she aim[ed] to make her ruling quickly,"337 which
suggested this result was imminent. Additionally, the method in
which 321 Studios introduced the congressional authority argument
provided little chance that it would be strongly considered by the
court. Presenting the argument in one phrase, buried in the middle
of several other claims, in one paragraph of the first claim for relief,338
321 Studios did not appear to rely very heavily on this point. There-
fore, it never had a high probability of being fully considered by the
court, which was necessary in order to adequately resolve the constitu-
tional question. 339 These foreshadowed events were played out in the
ruling by the court, in which Judge Illston relied on the previous
333 Id. at 2-3, 9.
334 See id. at 20-22.
335 See Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
Resolving Related Motions at 23, 321 Studios (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2004) (No. C-02-1955
SI), available at http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/MGM.v_321Studios/20040219_Or
der.pdf.
336 Barry Fox & Damian Carrington, Legal Blow for DVD-copying Software, NEWSCIEN-
TIST.COM NEWS SERVICE (May 16, 2003), at http://www.newscientist.com/news/news.
jsp?id=ns99993738.
337 Id.
338 See Complaint at 10, 321 Studios (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2002) (No. C-02-1955),
available at http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/20021220-321 studios_complaint.pdf.
339 There was a slim chance, however, that the question would be resolved by
Judge Illston. "In a possible glimmer of hope for 321, Judge Ilston [sic] was clearly
troubled by one legal point. If the DCMA [sic] stops people circumventing all copy
protection, what will happen in the future when copyright on a movie expires, but the
discs are still protected?" Fox & Carrington, supra note 336. Obviously enough, how-
ever, this slim chance did not pan out.
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cases, in particular Elcom, in coming to her conclusion.340 The court
granted summary judgment for the defendants that the plaintiff had
violated the DMCA, and the court denied the plaintiffs request for a
declaratory judgment that its products were permissible under § 1201
of the DMCA.341 Thus, even though the court was presented with a
fourth opportunity to answer the question of whether Congress had
the authority to enact the DMCA, the question was again inadequately
considered.
VII. CONGRESSIONAL RECOGNITION OF THE DMCA's
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY: Two BILLS
In the past year, two bills have been introduced in the House of
Representatives that display congressional recognition of the
problems inherent in § 1201 of the DMCA. 342 Both of these bills at-
tempt to correct these problems by altering the DMCA to provide ex-
ceptions for circumvention and trafficking that would enable
noninfringing uses:
To correct § 1201 of the DMCA and protect consumers' fair use
rights in the digital age, Representatives Rick Boucher (D-VA),John
Doolittle (R-CA) and Spencer Bachus (R-AL) have introduced H.R.
107, the Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act (DMCRA) .... The
DMCRA protects the balance between the rights of copyright hold-
ers to protect their work and those of citizens who legally purchase
copyrighted works to enjoy them. Representative Zoe Lofgren (D-
CA) introduced similar legislation, H.R. 1066--the Benefit Authors
without Limiting Advancement or Net Consumer Expectations
(BALANCE) Act, on March 4, 2003. 3 4 3
These bills both demonstrate that at least some member of Congress
recognize there are problems with the DMCA. Both bills are a step in
the right direction. Neither bill solves the problems, however, al-
though they would alleviate some of the problems that make the
DMCA unconstitutional. Neither could provide Congress with author-
ity to enact the DMCA in the first place; neither completely alleviates
340 Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
Resolving Related Motions at 21-23, 321 Studios (No. C-02-1955 SI), available at
http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/MGM-v_32IStudios/20040219_Order.pdf.
341 See id.
342 Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act of 2003, H.R. 107, 108th Cong.; Benefit
Authors without Limiting Advancement or Net Consumer Expectations (BALANCE)
Act of 2003, H.R. 1066, 108th Cong.
343 Protect Fair Use, New Releases in Congress: Bills We Support, at http://www.pro
tectfairuse.org/media/billscongress.html (last visited Jul. 5, 2004).
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the constitutional problems of the DMCA; and both, in practical ef-
fect, would deprive the DMCA of any realistic meaning.
The first bill was introduced on January 7, 2003.344 Entitled the
"Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act of 2003,' 3 4 5 the bill includes a
section on fair use amendments 346 and contains three provisions that
amend the DMCA. First, the bill exempts any person "acting solely in
furtherance of scientific research into technological protection mea-
sures"347 from the restrictions of § 1201 of the DMCA. Second, it
removes circumvention that does not result in copyright infringement
from the activity covered by the DMCA. 348 Finally, it absolves activities
that involve trafficking in products "capable of enabling significant
noninfringing use of a copyrighted work."349
The second bill was presented on March 4, 2003.350 This bill,
entitled "Benefit Authors without Limiting Advancement or Net Con-
sumer Expectations (BALANCE) Act of 2003,"351 was created more
specifically to fix the DMCA, " [t] o amend title 17, United States Code,
to safeguard the rights and expectations of consumers who lawfully
obtain digital entertainment."35 2 The bill first reports the findings of
Congress: (1) to fulfill the purpose of the Copyright Clause, there
must be an opportunity for fair use; (2) the DMCA endangers the
rights of legitimate consumers and prevents circumvention even for
fair uses; and (3) the balance between authors' and society's interests
in freedom of information was shifted too far and needs to be re-
stored. 353 The bill then proposes several changes to the DMCA that
would correct this imbalance. The bill first allows for reproducing or
accessing digital works for archival purposes. 35 4 It also allows for cir-
cumvention of technological measures if the circumvention is neces-
sary to make a noninfringing use and the copyright owner does not
make a method available in order to make such use. 35 5 Finally, it per-
mits trafficking in and manufacturing of products that enable circum-
vention if the means provided are necessary to enable noninfringing
use, the means are designed, produced, and marketed for the pur-
344 Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act of 2003, H.R. 107, 108th Cong.
345 Id. § 1.
346 Id. § 5.
347 Id.
348 See id.
349 Id.
350 BALANCE Act of 2003, H.R. 1066, 108th Cong.
351 Id. § 1.
352 Id.
353 Id. § 2.
354 See id. § 3.
355 See id. § 5.
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pose of enabling noninfringing uses, and the copyright owner does
not provide the means to make such use.35 6
The effect of either of these bills would be to partially remedy the
constitutional problems of the DMCA, at least regarding the conflict
with the Copyright Clause. 357 This still is not enough to save the
DMCA, however, as the Copyright Clause only provides Congress with
authority to regulate copyrights, not the power to regulate the circum-
vention of technological measures. Even if the anticircumvention
provision is designed to enforce copyrights, regulation of circumven-
tion of technological measures is not actually regulation of copyrights,
and therefore is still not authorized by the Copyright Clause. Further,
these modifications cannot make the DMCA constitutionally valid.
Even if the changes would fix the constitutional deficiencies, Congress
must pass a new bill that includes the changes, not attempt to mend
the old statute. The old statute is not valid, and it cannot be repaired
without a valid statute, therefore, there is nothing to repair; Congress
must pass a new statute.
Requiring Congress to create an entirely new bill would also pro-
vide a positive collateral benefit: it would force Congress to analyze
the new bill in its entirety, thereby providing an opportunity to see the
remaining constitutional infirmities in the bill. These infirmities can
be observed by the fact that the bill would still not actually be author-
ized by the Copyright Clause, as it does not purport to regulate copy-
rights, but merely regulates technological measures. The new bills
would merely relieve the inherent conflict between the DMCA and
the Copyright Clause, without bringing the statute within the clause's
scope. The new bills would also not be authorized by the Commerce
Clause or the treaty power, for the reasons discussed above. 358 There-
fore, neither bill would resolve the problem of Congress's lack of au-
thority to enact the DMCA.
Worse than this, there is a deeper problem with these bills.
Whether or not they fix the constitutional issues, they remove all
meaning from the DMCA. The two bills both allow for circumvention
and trafficking, so long as a substantial noninfringing use is enabled
or the act does not result in infringement. Theoretically, the al-
lowances made for activity that is not infringing or enables noninfring-
ing use would fix the statute. The problem, however, is that it makes
it too easy to bypass the statute. There is little difficulty in finding a
substantial noninfringing use for a device that allows circumvention,
356 See id.
357 See supra Part III.
358 See supra Parts 1V-V.
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or in finding someone who could circumvent the technology and then
distribute it after the circumvention. In fact, it would make bypassing
the statute so easy as to make the statute moot. It would "take the
teeth out of the tiger." The DMCA would retain either little or no
prohibition against circumvention and circumvention-enabling de-
vices. In sum, the bills would destroy the purpose of the DMCA.
Both bills do display congressional recognition of this problem,
however. They allow for circumvention, and trafficking in circumven-
tion devices, if the purpose is for a noninfringing use. This displays
Congress's knowledge that fair uses must be allowed. It also shows
that at least some members of Congress have realized that the DMCA,
as enacted, is illegitimate, and that the balance between authors'
rights and the dissemination of information has been tipped too far in
favor of the authors. Thus, both of these bills support the conclusion
that the DMCA is not constitutional, and that Congress lacked author-
ity for its enactment.
VIII. THE DMCA IN ACTION: IMPEDING THE PROGRESS
OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
"Eliciting publication is not an end in itself. Publication without
easy access to the product would defeat the social purpose of copy-
right already mentioned as primary. '359 This statement articulates the
most fundamental problem with the DMCA, and a major reason why
Congress had no authority to enact it: the DMCA promotes publica-
tion and protection of publishers and copyright holders, while inhib-
iting access to their works. The chilling effects created by the DMCA
not only fail to promote the progress of science and the arts, but ac-
tively obstruct this progress. 360
A. The DMCA Hinders the Promulgation of Research
The most significant adverse effect of the DMCA is that it actively
encourages researchers to either stop researching or to refrain from
publishing their research. In either scenario, the progress of art and
science is either curtailed or altogether defeated. But this is the effect
that is produced by the DMCA. One group has even been bold
359 BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 75-76 (1967).
360 See Nard, supra note 105, at 34-35 ("By focusing on circumvention technology
instead of infringing activity, the anti-device provisions are inconsistent with patent
law's constitutional command to promote the progress of the useful arts and may
adversely affect patent law's incentive dynamic."); see also Sheets, supra note 87, at 3
("The DMCA anti-circumvention measures fundamentally change copyright law in a
way that is sure to crush innovation.").
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enough to state that "[tlhe DMCA is being used to silence research-
ers, computer scientists and critics."3 6 1
Some commentators, however, "have argued that these fears are
unwarranted under a proper reading of the statute, and that such
fears may be exaggerated by DMCA critics to increase opposition to
the DMCA. '" 3 62 The bases for these contentions lie in § 1201(g) (2),
§ 1201(g) (4), and § 1201(j). These subsections provide exemptions
from § 1201 (a) for "permissible acts of encryption research,"3 6 3 for
"use of technological means for research activities, '3 64 and for "secur-
ity testing. '3 65 Based on these exemptions, some commentators feel
that research activities are not covered by the DMCA. A closer analysis
of the statute, however, will show that these activities, although techni-
cally permitted,366 are, in practice, impeded, if not curtailed alto-
gether, by the DMCA. This result is produced both by the actual text
of the DMCA and by the reaction of researchers to the DMCA. 367
The text of the DMCA does allow for some encryption research to
be conducted. 368 However, this research cannot, under the statute, be
published. The statute places a series of restrictions on an encryption
researcher.369 First, to obtain the exemption from § 1201 (a) (1) (A),
the encryption researcher must have "made a good faith effort to ob-
361 The Issue: US Constitution, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), at
http://www.anti-dmca.org (last updatedJan. 25, 2004); see also Sheets, supra note 87,
at 20 ("In the field of encryption, innovation is effectively outlawed.").
362 Joseph P. Liu, The Law and Technology of Digital Rights Management: The DMCA
and the Regulation of Scientific Research, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 501, 503 (2003) (citing
Declan McCullagh, Debunking DMCA Myths, CNET NEWS.COM (Aug. 19, 2002), at
http://news.com.com/2010-12-950229.html).
363 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (2) (2000).
364 Id. § 1201 (g) (4).
365 Id. § 1201(j).
366 See Liu, supra note 362, at 503 ("[Plractically speaking, certain types of aca-
demic encryption research can still occur under the DMCA.").
367 A full analysis of this point is beyond the scope of this Note; therefore, this
section provides an overview of the main points. For a more in-depth discussion, see,
for example, id. passim.
368 See id.
369 See id.
[T] he DMCA: imposes additional hurdles, which researchers must overcome
before engaging in and publishing their research; limits the universe of indi-
viduals with whom researchers can freely communicate about their research;
requires disclosure of the intention to engage in research and the fruits of
such research to third-parties; affects the content of academic research pa-
pers; and limits avenues for publication of the research.
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tain authorization before the circumvention"37 0 or, for security test-
ing, have "the authorization of the owner or operator."371 This
creates the first hurdle for researchers to overcome, in that they either
must actually obtain authorization or at least make a "good faith" ef-
fort to acquire authorization. "Moreover, it is not clear whether a re-
searcher must accept conditions on his or her authorization to remain
in 'good faith."' 3 72
Thus, exemption from § 1201 (a) (1) (A) may require permission
from the copyright owner; this gives control over the work not to the
copyright law, but to the owner. Second, publication of the results of
the research would most likely violate the antitrafficking provisions of
the DMCA.3 73 This means that, in order to publish the research, the
researcher must be protected by an exemption from the DMCA.
However, the exemptions provided for in § 1201 (a) (2) only exempt
the researcher from liability for dissemination of "the technological
means to another person with whom he or she is working... or for
the purpose of ... [verification] "3 7 4 or for dissemination that is in-
tended "for the sole purpose of performing ... acts of security test-
ing. '3 75 Publication is not allowed in any of these situations, because
publication is intended to disseminate the information to the public,
not merely to co-workers and not just to increase the owner's secur-
ity.3 7 6 Therefore, these exemptions do not allow for publication. Fur-
thermore, there are no exemptions from § 1201(b) (1). This means
that researchers cannot publish any work that discusses the circum-
vention of a copy control. 37 7 Thus, these exemptions merely allow
370 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (g) (2) (C).
371 Id. § 1201(j) (1).
372 Ethan Preston & John Lofton, Computer Security Publications: Information Econom-
ics, Shifting Liability and the First Amendment, 24 WHITrIER L. REV. 71, 123 (2002).
373 See Imfeld, supra note 285, at 112 ("Researchers and educators, for example,
who publish articles or present papers discussing how to bypass the encryption device
on a DVD to access a copyrighted work for educational or commentary purposes
could face criminal and civil penalties."); Preston & Lofton, supra note 372, at 121-22
("Most exploits published on the Internet for the sake of demonstrating a vulnerabil-
ity would probably be found to be primarily designed or produced for the purpose of
circumventing digital rights technologies, or to have only limited commercially signifi-
cant purpose or use besides circumventing digital fights technologies.").
374 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (g) (4) (B).
375 Id. § 12010) (4).
376 See Preston & Lofton, supra note 372, at 125 (concluding that the limitations
on the exemption for security testing could "restrict computer security publications to
the general public").
377 See Liu, supra note 362, at 512 (discussing the concern that the exemption is
incomplete, in that it does not cover § 1201(b), and concluding that "an encryption
researcher may be shielded from liability under 1201 (a), but still subject to liability
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copyright owners to dictate when the DMCA applies and when it does
not, they do not actually provide for researchers to conduct and pub-
lish their work. The DMCA stifles the progress of learning, because it
limits the ability of researchers to increase the state of encryption
technology.
Another important factor in assessing the impact of the DMCA
on researchers is the actual reaction of the research community. How
the researchers respond to the DMCA is more significant than the
theoretical effect that the DMCA should have. This is because their
reaction to the DMCA controls how much research will be conducted
and disseminated. Therefore, an examination of the effect of the
DMCA on researchers is necessary.
The first major effect on research in the United States came as a
result of the criminal cases threatened or actually brought under the
DMCA.3 78 "As a result of the Felten and ElcomSoft disputes, several
prominent foreign computer scientists who study cryptographic sys-
tems have publicly stated that they will no longer attend computer
science conferences in the United States. '3 79 Conferences are one of
the methods by which members of a scientific field can come together
to discuss recent events in that field, to promote new research, and to
create new ideas for future research.380 Thus, if prominent members
of a field are afraid to come to the United States and share their re-
search for fear of being prosecuted under the DMCA for work that is
legal in their own countries, it will encumber the progress of science
in this nation.
The problem has expanded beyond even the reluctance of a few
foreign scientists to venture into the United States, however. "Euro-
pean computer scientists have been warned to avoid US conferences
following the arrest of a Russian expert accused of breaking the Digi-
tal Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). Some have decided to move
under these alternative provisions"); Preston & Lofton, supra note 372, at 120 ("It is
the DMCA's other two core provisions [the antitrafficking provisions] which could
directly threaten computer security publications.").
378 See United States v. Elcom, Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Felten
v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. (No. CV-01-2669) (D.N.J. 2001)), available at http://
www. law.duke.edu/curriculum/courseHomepages/spring2002/724-02/FeltenCom
plaint.pdf.
379 COHEN ET AL., supra note 280, at 594.
380 See S. Anastopoulou & M. Sharples, A System Prototype to Support Academics' Life-
long Learning: Selecting a Design Concept and the Role of the Design Process, 13 PROC. OF
NAT'L CONF. HELLENIC OPERATIONAL RES. SoC'Y (2000), available at http://postgrad.
eee.bham.ac.uk/anasto/helors.pdf (recognizing the importance of conferences to
academics' learning and how conferences promote research, learning, and sharing of
information).
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computer security events outside the US in response. '' 3 8 1 The publica-
tion of warnings to foreign scientists, by foreign governments, to avoid
the United States is not likely to promote the progress of art and sci-
ence in the United States. It is highly probable that these warnings,
which are the direct result of the DMCA, will inhibit progress in this
country. Further, international conferences are finding new locations
to hold their events. After the Felten case, the "organisers of one con-
ference that concentrates on testing the security of data protection
systems, the International Hiding Workshop, have already decided to
no longer hold the event in the US.13 82 Again, conferences are im-
portant to the development of science, and they are being diverted
away from the United States. All of these results (the reluctance of
foreign scientists to travel to the United States, the warnings from for-
eign officials, and the departure of conferences from this country)
impede the progress of arts and sciences.
The DMCA also restricts publication of research after it has been
conducted. "Since its enactment, the DMCA has been used to prevent
the posting on the Internet of information about how to circumvent
encryption technology and to prevent researchers and technology de-
velopers from disseminating their latest research in the area."383 This
research is important for the progress of encryption technology, as
well as for the security of the program or device that the encryption is
meant to protect.3 8 4 And it is not merely research focused on circum-
vention of encryption technology that is prohibited from being
posted. All kinds of researchers have encountered difficulty in dis-
seminating their research; the Felten and Elcom cases discussed
above385 are examples of this phenomenon. "Professor Edward Felten
of Princeton University was asked to withdraw his paper from a schol-
arly conference, lest he be prosecuted under the DMCA. And a Rus-
sian cryptographer was arrested after giving a presentation on his
company's software that removed security protection from Adobe
381 Will Knight, Computer Scientists Boycott US Over Digital Copyright Law, NEWSCIEN-
TIST.COM (July 23, 2001), at http://www.newscientist.com/news/news.jsp?id=ns0000
1063; see also E-mail from Tim Bartelsman, to Departments of Canadian Heritage and
Industry (Sept. 15, 2001), available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/incrp-
prda.nsf/vwGeneratedlnterE/rp00590e.html [hereinafter Bartelsman E-mail] ("Even
the Russian government has gone as far as to issue a travel warning to all its program-
mers and technologists not to travel to the US.").
382 Knight, supra note 381.
383 Peter K. Yu, The Escalating Copyright Wars, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 907 (2004).
384 See Declaration of Matthew Blaze, Felten v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. (No.
CV-01-2669) (D.NJ. 2001), available at http://www.crypto.com/papers/mab-felten
decl.txt.
385 See supra Part VI.
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e-books. '3 1s 6 Both Felten and the Russian, Sklyarov, were at least tem-
porarily prevented from disseminating their research. (Felten did
eventually succeed in publishing his paper.38 7) This trend did not
stop with just two incidents: another question involving the publica-
tion of research culminated in Edelman v. N2H2, Inc.3 8 8  Ben
Edelman, a computer researcher, sought a declaratory judgment that
he had the right to reverse engineer the defendant's software and
publish the results.38 9 The court dismissed the case on the ground
that Edelman had failed to show that he had standing, as he had not
demonstrated a sufficiently imminent injury.390 This case shows
Edelman's concern that he would be prosecuted for publishing his
research, but the issue was not resolved. There are also a number of
examples, outside of court proceedings, of researchers refusing to
publish their work:
Noted Cryptographer and contributor to the advanced encryption
standard (AES) to replace DES refused to publish his critical analy-
sis of a digital use management technology from Intel. In this case
Niels Ferguson is not even a US citizen, nor does he reside in the
US. However because he must do business with the US he has been
advised by legal counsel to not publish his work.3 9 1
The plight of Niels Ferguson is similar to several other researchers,
except that they had already posted their research on the Internet.
However, these "well-known computer security experts pulled down
their works from the Internet ... for fear of being prosecuted under
1998's Digital Millennium Copyright Act. '3 92 These events further
support the theory that the DMCA prohibits dissemination of
research.
Examples also exist outside the context of encryption research,
such as the case of Andrew Huang.393 "U.S. publisher John Wiley &
Sons dropped plans to publish a book by security researcher Andrew
'Bunnie' Huang, citing DMCA liability concerns."3 9 4 To make matters
386 Yu, supra note 383 (citations omitted).
387 See Scott A. Craver et al., Reading Between the Lines: Lessons from the SDMI Chal-
lenge, PROC. OF 10TH USENIX SECURITY SympOsIuM (2001), available at http://www.use
nix.org/events/secO1/craver.pdf.
388 263 F. Supp. 2d 137 (D. Mass. 2003).
389 Id. at 138.
390 Id. at 139,
391 Bartelsman E-mail, supra note 381.
392 Robert Lemos, Security Workers: Copyright Law Stifles, CNET NEWS.COM (Sept. 6,
2001), at http://news.com.com/2100-1001-272716.html?legacy=cnet&tag=tp-pr.
393 ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, supra note 17, at 3.
394 Id.
2004] 2177
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
worse, "Huang's initial attempt to self-publish was thwarted after his
online shopping cart provider also withdrew, citing DMCA
concerns."
395
To prohibit the publication, and therefore the dissemination, of
research hardly seems to satisfy the purpose of promoting the pro-
gress of learning. The most egregious effect of the DMCA, however, is
its inducement of researchers to limit their activities or to refrain from
conducting any research at all. "[A] number of prominent computer
security experts have curtailed their legitimate research activities out
of fear of potential DMCA liability. '396 One of these researchers is
Alan Cox, who, after the Sklyarov case, "resigned from the committee
of the USENIX Advanced Computing Systems Association, which or-
ganises many US events, over the incident and pledges to steer clear
of US conferences." 97 Another example is Matthew Blaze, "a re-
search scientist at AT&T Laboratories." 398 He has stated, "[b] ecause
of the DMCA, I am reluctant to continue engaging in the study of
vulnerabilities in existing and proposed security systems, despite hav-
ing previously enjoyed a number of successes with my research in this
area."399 Both of these examples demonstrate the ramifications of the
DMCA, in that it discourages, rather than encourages, research.
Thus, the DMCA does not promote, but rather inhibits, progress in
science and art.400
These illustrations show the results produced by the DMCA: re-
searchers either refuse to research in the first place, refuse to publish
their work, or refuse to come to the United States. This result is
grounded in a reading of the DMCA that shows that publication of
research in the United States, without the copyright owner's authori-
zation, could well result in a violation of the DMCA. This result is
antithetical to the purpose of copyright protections, and the authority
395 Id.
396 Id. at 4.
397 Knight, supra note 381; see also Bartelsman E-mail, supra note 381 ("Alan Cox,
software developer and key figure in the Linux community resigns from Usenix. Ref-
uses to travel to the US.").
398 Declaration of Matthew Blaze, Felten v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. (No.
CV-01-2669) (D.N.J. 2001), available at http://www.crypto.com/papers/mab-felten
decl.txt.
399 Id.
400 See BELLIA ET AL., supra note 3, at 312 ("[P] rohibiting circumvention of access
controls will actually curtail the development of truly effective technological measures
designed to prevent access to protected works, because content owners can rely in-
stead on marginally effective measures backed by the protections of the DMCA.")
(citing Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse
Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1639, 1646 (2002)).
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to enact provisions that achieve this result is explicitly withheld from
Congress by the Copyright Clause.
B. The DMCA Prohibits Legitimate Uses of Copyrighted Works40 1
The Copyright Act of 1976 codified the concept of "fair use" in
§ 107 of Title 17 of the United States Code.40 2 This concept repre-
sents a limit on the rights of copyright holders. The statute provides a
list of factors to consider in determining whether a use is a fair use, as
well as a list of purposes for which fair use can be made.40 3 These
purposes include "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching ...
scholarship, or research. ' 40 4 However, the ability to engage in the ac-
tivities permitted by the fair use doctrine is being curtailed by the
DMCA. 405
The inclusion of § 1201 (c)(1), which states that "[n]othing in
this section shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to
copyright infringement, including fair use, under this title,"40 6 suggests
that "Congress did not intend to diminish the effect of section 107
.... 47 The problem is that "the statute prevents the defense of fair
use for encryption researchers and academicians by defining 'anti-cir-
cumvention as something distinct from copyright infringement.' 40 8
But "[flair use is only a defense to copyright infringement." 40 9 This
means that fair use, although not restricted by the DMCA, does not
401 See Copyright Law Professors' Brief, supra note 143, at 3-4 ("Furthermore, the
DMCA frustrates the legitimate access of copyrighted works by the general public,
which 'is the overriding purpose of the constitutional provision.'") (quoting Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 241 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
402 See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
403 See id.
404 Id.
405 See Imfeld, supra note 285, at 112 ("[T]he DMCA's 'fair use' exemption for
encryption research ... dangerously narrows the fair use defense that once offered
protection against copyright infringement under the Copyright Act of 1976."); Jeff
Sharp, Coming Soon to Pay-Per-View: How the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Enables Digi-
tal Content Owners to Circumvent Educational Fair Use, 40 AM. Bus. L.J. 1, 33 (2002)
(asserting that the DMCA is "crowding out fair use").
406 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (1) (2000) (emphasis
added).
407 Cathy Nowlen, Note, Edelman v. N2H2: Copyright Infringement ? Reverse Engineer-
ing of Filtering Software Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 10J. INT'Er . PROP. L.
409, 414 (2003).
408 Imfeld, supra note 285, at 125 (citing MELVILLE B. NI MMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 [F] [6] (2001)); see also Sharp, supra note 405, at 39
("Violating section 1201 makes one a transgressor of the anti-circumvention provi-
sions-a criminal and tortious act separate from copyright infringement.").
409 Sharp, supra note 405, at 39.
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provide a defense to activity covered by the DMCA. This sentiment
has been echoed by the courts, which have held that the fair use de-
fense is not applicable to § 1201(a)(2). 410 These courts have shown
that the fair use defense does not protect a person who circumvents
an access control; fair use, however, also does not help a person who
violates § 1201(b):
The real effect of § 1201 (b) will be that while it remains legal under
the DMCA to make fair use of a lawfully accessed work, there proba-
bly will be no device available that is legally capable of making the
copy. Manufacturing or distributing such a device, a near necessity
for making fair use of an encrypted work in a digital environment,
violates § 1201(b). 4 11
Therefore, unless the person wishing to make fair use is a skilled
hacker, the DMCA effectively eliminates the fair use defense.
412
Fair use is important because it provides a means of balancing the
rights of copyright holders with the public's interest in dissemination
of information. 413 Without fair use, which promotes learning through
improved access to knowledge, this balance will shift towards copy-
right holders, and away from the promotion of learning. An example
of how far the DMCA shifts the balance will help make this clear:
The DMCA gives publishers the power to prevent you from printing
a page, loaning a book to your friends or in some cases, even read-
ing it out loud. For example, if you purchase and download an elec-
tronic book from the Internet and figure out how to circumvent the
reader software so that you can print it out to read in the bathroom,
the DMCA makes what you have done a federal crime, and if you
tell anyone how you did it, you can be looking at a fine of up to
$500,000 and 5 years in prison. This has happened. 4 14
This may seem extreme, and it is. But it is activity that is covered by
the DMCA, because the reader software is an access control on the
book, and in circumventing it, you are violating § 1201 (a) (1) of the
410 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 322
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429,
458-59 (2d Cir. 2001); RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. 2:99CV02070, 2000
WL 127311, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000); see also Imfeld, supra note 285, at
129-36 (discussing cases and arguing that the DMCA has inhibited the fair use
defense).
411 Sharp, supra note 405, at 35.
412 See id. at 41 (recognizing that the statements about the "preservation of fair use
under the DMCA provide little help in making fair use of technologically locked
content").
413 See Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977).
414 Aaron Logue, How the DMCA Affects Us, at http://www.cryogenius.com/dmca.
htn (last visited Jul. 5, 2004).
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DMCA. Moreover, in telling someone how you did it, you are violat-
ing § 1201 (a) (2). To make matters even worse, because the courts
have determined that fair use does not apply to § 1201(a), there is no
defense that can protect you from liability. Thus, by prohibiting these
uses, the DMCA restricts the dissemination of information, thereby
inhibiting the progress of learning.
C. The Overall Effect of the DMCA Is to Impede Progress
The DMCA was ostensibly enacted to promote progress by en-
couraging authors and inventors to create new works by providing ex-
tra protection for those works.4 15 Although a legitimate goal which
should result in valid consequences, this asserted purpose does not, in
practice, produce such results. The actual effects of the DMCA are to
stifle research activities,4 16 to create incentives to refrain from dissemi-
nating research, 41 7 and to prohibit legitimate uses of works.4 18 The
real world consequences of the DMCA counteract the promotional
effect of the protections granted to authors and inventors, producing
an aggregate result that impedes the progress of science and art.41 9
Therefore, by enacting the DMCA, Congress violated an express limi-
tation on its authority included in the Copyright Clause in the Consti-
tution; the DMCA is unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
If the U.S. Constitution is to be implemented with integrity in accor-
dance with the principle that the Copyright Clause is a limitation
on, as well as a grant of, congressional power, the unconstitutional-
ity of the DMCA is beyond doubt. The statute is a complete repudi-
ation of the constitutional policies that copyright promote learning,
protect the public domain, and provide public access. 420
The DMCA must be declared invalid.421 The federal government
is one of limited and enumerated powers, 4 22 and Congress must have
415 See H.R. REp. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 24-25 (1998).
416 See supra Part VII.A.
417 See id.
418 See supra Part VII.C.
419 See Liu, supra note 362, at 528-35 (concluding that the burdens placed on
encryption research by the DMCA are not justified).
420 Patterson, supra note 86, at 57.
421 See Quinn, supra note 1, at 36; Copyright Law Professors' Brief, supra note 143,
at 19 ("If Congress wishes to afford protection for 'technological measures' applied to
protect copyrighted works beyond that which copyright law already affords, it must
return to the drawing board.").
422 See supra Part I.
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authority from the Constitution in order for any law it enacts to be
valid. Congress did not have constitutional authority to enact the
DMCA. The Copyright Clause does not grant Congress authority for
the DMCA. 423 The Commerce Clause fails to provide constitutional
authority for this statute. 424 Finally, the treaty power fails to authorize
the enactment of this statute. 425 Furthermore, by impeding the pro-
gress of art and science, the DMCA is antithetical to the purpose of
the Copyright Clause. This represents a major problem for a statute
purportedly enacted to cultivate copyright protections. The DMCA
also contravenes the promotion of progress of art and science in its
actual, real-world effects.42 6 Therefore, Congress surpassed its author-
ity by enacting the DMCA, and the DMCA is unconstitutional. 427
423 See supra Part III.
424 See supra Part IV.
425 See supra Part V.
426 See supra Part VII.
427 See Sheets, supra note 87, at 26 ("[T]he anti-circumvention provisions of the
DMCA... are invalid because the provisions are not related to promoting progress in
the arts and sciences."); cf Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)
("[A]n act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void ...."); Vanhorne
v. Dorrance, 28 F. Cas. 1012, 1015 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (No. 16,857) ("[If a legislative
act oppugns a constitutional principle, the former must give way, and be rejected on
the score of repugnance ... it will be the duty of the court to adhere to the constitu-
tion, and to declare the act null and void.").
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